Seven steps for Jeroen Weimar to revive DTP

Today is the first business day of the Department of Transport and Planning under new secretary Jeroen Weimar. Mr Weimar takes over from Paul Younis who led the department for six years after a period in local government.

The previous leadership

Paul Younis could be said to have been a steady hand in keeping transport services running during the pandemic. His gaining of an increasing number of roles (most notably Planning) may have indicated government comfort with him as a backroom operator with politicians like Daniel Andrews and Jacinta Allan having all the limelight. 

Last year I described him as an introvert who hides his light under a bushel. Inspiring patronage, winning new funding (eg the Bus Plan), minimising financial losses (eg fare evasion) and media skills are not necessarily the first things that spring to mind when considering the previous Secretary's legacy. Neither did he have a background in running public transport services, unlike leaders in the PTV era. 

Some of the above might have been seen as secondary given that during Younis' term Melbourne was basically a giant building site with major project construction agencies getting the billions, calling the shots, doing the media and competing for staff talent. DTP might still be the central agency on paper but has given the impression of drifting or punching below its weight. Which might have been what the  Labor government wanted given its infrastructure-first strategy, lingering memories over bad departmental advice (regarding Myki procurement) and a preference for seeking advice outside the department, such as demonstrated with the Suburban Rail Loop. 

Current context

Things are changing as we "switch on the Big Build".

Projects like the Metro Tunnel will open soon.

The state government's budgetary position has deteriorated while community demand for transport remains, abetted by high population growth.

There aren't as many big new infrastructure projects announced now as in 2018 but the need to get value for money is more than ever.

And that's even before mentioning the emergence of housing as a major policy issue and next year's state election. 

Opportunity for new leadership

DTP could be described as a sleeping giant. It has many good people but effort is needed to maximise what it manages to get funded in a contestable policy environment. It particularly needs a new spirit and style of leadership. I outlined five challenges for the incoming DTP Secretary here. 

All eyes are on Mr Weimar to deliver what is needed. His previous long-term operational experience in transport and ability to communicate a network vision give hope. As does his tendency to engage rather than shrink when a microphone is pointed his way.

Mr Weimar will need to inspire DTP staff, operators, media and even the general public in ways previous bosses didn't or couldn't. Whereas the five challenges before were mainly about what to do, there also needs to be work on vision, culture and even subject matter knowledge (given the backgrounds of some executives) for DTP to regain its central standing in the transport institutional ecosystem.  

A potential approach, with no call on the state budget, could be something like below. 

Seven steps for renewal

1. Set a culture and expectation of 'every day good service'

This includes 'thinking like a passenger'. It is wide enough to encompass matters like frequency, reliability, accessibility, connectivity, overall experience and potential for improvements. Including areas where DTP is directly responsive for, eg network planning, ticketing and information. 

This needs to be inform relationships with stakeholders such as government and operators, with the latter getting a signal that the department is watching more vigorously than it might have done in the recent past. On the other side of the sheet, DTP needs to be more responsive to operators' suggestions for cost-effective improvements since a common perception of DTP (rightly or wrongly) is that of an inflexible 'brick wall'.   

2. Leaders to ride the network at least one half day per fortnight  

Time On The Network (TOTN) would be a general expectation for anyone senior. This must include non-regular and off-peak travel like evenings and weekends for the full picture. Middle and outer suburbs, where most taxpayers live, too. Noting what is seen, talking to 'coal face' staff and reporting back observations and potential improvements are all essential to ensure value from the time expended.

Most other DTP staff could get about two or three paid hours per fortnight in on-network customer service roles at key train, tram and bus stops with quality reports of observations and potential improvements a pre-requisite for promotion. 

Those joining DTP from another department, no matter how senior, would have a minimum two weeks on-network customer service experience, with postings at interchanges across Melbourne, before starting their role. Time in the PTV call centre might also qualify. 

This unprecedented but necessary investment in staff development could be funded by improvements in internal processes.   


3. Foster a growth mindset, set a patronage target and improve network promotion

This is all about having and communicating a positive vision for the transport network including its ability to change lives and save people money. Like WMATA's General Manager Randy Clarke does here.

The last secretary's impact here was limited, with the dent in confidence due to the pandemic and widespread construction-based disruptions not helping.

However opportunities will increase as construction winds down, projects get completed and (potentially) some employers wind back working from home. Like with Sydney's Metro, we should capitalise on our Metro Tunnel to encourage growth.

PTV had an (internal) patronage target under Ian Dobbs but this did not seem to continue under later leaders. 

Every agency or body has a public persona. As per their end of year wrap-up videos, project authorities for Metro Tunnel, level crossing removals and the Suburban Rail Loop (and campaigns like #Fix800Bus) had an upbeat vibe.

In contrast DTP under Younis was more subdued about its achievements (to the point of underselling genuine improvements). This can't be good for (a) network patronage and therefore fare revenue, (b) the morale of staff who worked on these improvements, (c) maximising the political capital and goodwill obtained from transport network improvements, and (d) the standing of DTP itself, especially relative to other agencies competing for scarce funding. 

Big opportunity exists for Jeroen Weimar to engender a growth mindset in transport that stresses community and personal benefits. Hopefully he can continue where he left off (in his previous transport role) with this video articulating some of a network vision.     

4. Seek savings so more can be done

This is the first part of gathering a chest to fund improvements without recourse to new budget financing. That's a big plus as it allows things to be done quicker. And an ability to self-fund some initiatives gives DTP a big tick in Treasury's book (especially needed now given the reputation for project cost blow-outs). The ill-fated Bus Plan is a cautionary tale of what can happen when you bring out a plan without having the the funding sorted first. 

Finding savings that do not compromise service levels, reliability, safety and overall user experience needs to be a top priority. Examples might include deleting or modifying overlapping routes, 'greater good' timetable reforms, reduced fare evasion, staffing savings, process improvements etc. Such savings could be found from network observations, talking to people or analysing information. As a very small example, topical given that yesterday was a public holiday, there exist university shuttle bus routes that operate on days when universities are not open.

Some savings will no doubt be controversial and (often for good reasons) might not proceed. However there does need to be more encouragement for ideas here from all levels of the department. The more savings identified the more self-funding wins become possible (see next). 


5. Look for early and cheap wins 

Just because one hears that the government is broke (or that DTP isn't always the strongest at making convincing business cases that the government is willing to fund!) is no excuse to give up on improvements. They just need to be cut to the cloth available.

Having something happen far beats having nothing happen. Success here requires a keen eye to identify quick wins. Success could also kick-start bigger initiatives (which could be the subject of a budget bid).

Some improvements could be just a procedural issue while others might involve a small bus route or timetable change (with examples here). With trains an incredibly small number of extra trips scheduled at certain times (eg mid-evenings and Sunday mornings) can slash waits by up to 50%, make many trips more practical and support the major events sector. Promotion would be an integral part of implementation to maximise patronage and revenue gains from the improvement.  


6. Fix processes to get good stuff happening quicker

It's amazing that it is quicker to do a complex capital project like remove a level crossing than to substantially add to or reform a bus network. The former, with a dedicated organisation, is a refined mass production effort while bus reform is like a cottage industry with everything treated as one-off exceptions. 

DTP processes are convoluted even for minor timetable changes that require neither new buses nor public consultation. This slows the rate of progress compared to cities better at implementing bus reform like Auckland and Perth.

Part of this could be because DTP leaders think they are performing well by choosing certain methods that present progress on things like bus reform, overly favourably. We learned about this at the last Parliament Accounts and Estimates Committee hearing, as discussed here. Other examples exist, with bus fare evasion being a case where independent observers reach different conclusions to the optimism conveyed by DTP figures. More rigour is needed so bosses know what's going on and the full extent of the challenges ahead - without sugar-coating.  

What I consider a better approach for measuring bus network reform, based on periodical network health checks, indicated reform to only about 2% of bus routes per year. That's a glacial pace with reform to the full network taking many decades. It's slower than what Auckland and Perth achieve. It is also well down on our own record during the much more dynamic 2006 - 2010 period and the unbeaten since 'big service' upgrades of July 2014.

Measurement helps understanding. With that can come better processes to fix problems and make the network more useful. DTP 'worker bees' possibly suffer most from an (unfair) perception that their whole department is remote when in fact their understanding of issues is sound. 

It could be that ideas that arise can be fragile things that often get killed on their way to the top. For example the Bus Plan said all the right things but the Secretary, despite all the people helping, was unable to convince government it needed funding in either the 2023 or 2024 state budgets. Management weakness here can  affect general morale, with those wanting to do stuff tempted to seek opportunities elsewhere. 

The immediate state budgetary outlook is not strong. However opportunities may still exist for the new Secretary to make DTP more effective and successful by identifying economies, noting opportunities for cheap wins, fixing convoluted processes and presenting compelling business cases that the government is more likely to accept.

The drying up of cheap finance might even be an opportunity as it  might force a renewed focus on the sort of cost-effective service-oriented improvements that have played second fiddle to big infrastructure projects for too long. A well-managed DTP is in pole position to take advantage of this swing, especially given changing state political geographies and the government's need to prepare for next year's state election.  

7. Fix data accuracy and the PTV website - starting with disruption and service change advice

Unlike operations, which is normally done by a private operator under a contract or franchise, online  passenger information is a DTP responsibility. This can be good and bad. For example a negligent private operator can be 'called in' or even stripped of its franchise whereas this form of accountability is unavailable if DTP underperform. 

Sadly the latter is too often the case. Root causes include (a) routes and timetables being so complex that no one in DTP/PTV can understand nor communicate them accurately (with cheap to fix summer and public holiday service patterns for buses being prime examples), (b) fragmented processes for data (mapping, timetable data, text writing, disruption advice and social media being divided), (c) a lack of a data quality culture and (d) archaic systems  with only weekly updates that mean that even if data errors are detected a fix can take days.  

As I discussed here, official disruption and service change advice is found across many parts of the PTV website, often with no logic. Having senior DTP executives to ride the network more as they will see see, and possibly be inconvenienced by, the many problems that weak attention to data causes passengers.  

Conclusion

I have identified seven low or no cost steps that could, at least in the public transport area, lead to a higher performing and better respected DTP with improved culture and management. That would have knock on benefits with a more useful and better used transport network that genuinely changes lives and saves people money. 

Have I missed any steps? Or do you think some were unnecessary? Your comments would be appreciated and can be left below. 

7 public transport project bungles

In just a few days Jeroen Weimar will take over the running of the Department of Transport and Planning (DTP). Oversight of procurement and operating contracts worth billions of dollars per year is a major part of its work.

Some have worked out fine. Others had problems like going over time, over budget or not delivering goods to the functionality envisaged.   

Reading and thinking about the issues faced is important for DTP to become a learning organisation that does not repeat past mistakes. Here's 7 projects or contracts that didn't go quite as smoothly as hoped.  

1. Scratch tickets. Introduced in 1989, this was a pre-electronic ticketing system introduced to facilitate the removal of ticket selling staff from the rail and tram networks. Passengers had to pre-purchase a card ticket and scratch away the foil for the day/time of travel. However many only did that when they saw an approaching ticket inspector so fare evasion was rife. Scratch tickets were eventually replaced with Metcard. Background here and here. 

2. Metcard. The successor to 'scratchies', Metcard was our first foray into electronic ticketing, Commencing from the late 1990s, tickets were purchased from machines with data encoded on a magnetic strip. The project went over time and over budget. Vandalism, unreliability and the inability to buy a daily ticket on a tram were major problems in the system's first five years. Only a few years after Metcard had been got to a reasonably reliable state, the government decided it was time to shop for a new ticketing system - more on that later.

3. Rail franchising Mark 1. Like scratch tickets this was a product of the state's 1990s austerity and a political belief that private sector provision was always more efficient than through a state instrumentality. By the mid-1990s the Kennett government under minister Alan Brown had greatly reduced operating costs for the train and tram network while delivering some service frequency increases. 

However they went a step further, following the UK in splitting and then franchising out rail operations to international bidders. The franchise contracts were based on diminishing public subsidy and sharply rising patronage but operators bid anyway, eager to shut rivals out. And the state went along, naively thinking they'd get a bargain. Operations were relatively reliable but operators were struggling, asking the government for more money. Then it fell in a heap with National Express pulling out and the whole thing being renegotiated. The surviving operators continued on a revised, more favourable agreement including a requirement to re-integrate divided systems and address a driver training backlog. 

Later rail franchise models left the risk with the government and were more generous to the operator. This put rail franchising on a more stable footing (free of the post-pandemic turmoil in the UK) but meant that hoped for financial savings were not sustained. 

4. Southern Cross Station public private partnership. The Bracks Labor government wanted a flashy new station to complement its investment in regional fast rail. However they also wanted to be seen as financially prudent given still raw memories of the Cain-Kirner government. A solution to get things done without incurring extra public debt was to do a private-public partnership deal to rebuild and operate the station for 30 years. A cash-cow earner for an unaccountable superannuation fund, Southern Cross is now poorly regarded by users for its broken escalators, blank passenger information displays, diesel fumes, declining retail and more. And the operating contract limits what government can do until it expires in 2036. 

5.  Murray Basin Rail Project. This is a project to standardise and renew rail freight lines in the north-west of the state funded by the state and federal governments. After difficulties the project stalled but then resumed. The state Auditor-General wrote a critical report in 2020. A summary of the project is here. 

6. Myki smartcard ticketing. Successive Victorian state governments have struggled with procuring and operating successive public transport ticketing systems. Much more than in other states, Victorians have seen few years in the last 35 that ticketing hasn't made news headlines. 

Myki was the smart-card based system intended to replace Metcard. After time and cost blow-outs the project was descoped before eventually being delivered. 

Myki serves regular commuters well but the non-availability of short-term tickets (one of the items removed from the scope) and the more recent removal of cash top-ups from buses has made it poor for spontaneous travel. That's something that Myki's successor under Conduent should sort out, though recent news items indicate issues there too. 

Former premier John Brumby has blamed poor advice received from the  Department of Transport, especially its recommendation of a poorly qualified tenderer in Kamco, for Myki's problems.    

7. Melbourne bus franchising. The state government in 2012 wanted to save some money. Despite warnings from others in the industry (arguably sore losers who can't be considered impartial) the state awarded the rights to run nearly a third of Melbourne's bus network (Melbourne Metropolitan Bus Franchise) to France-based Transdev. 

The deal indeed saved money according to the state auditor-general. However Melbourne transport managers and auditors typically don't ride buses. Thus their views were not sullied by on-the-ground facts.  Including Transdev losing control of graffiti and skimping on cleaning, to the extent of leaning on staff to clean buses in their own time. And, as would later be discovered in 2017 when Transport Safety Victoria ordered buses off the road, they were cutting corners on maintenance too with DoT apparently too unaware or aloof to intervene earlier. 

Not surprisingly Transdev lost the contract when it came up for refranchising, with Kinetic taking over. However the fleet management crisis didn't do them long term damage; Transdev is now back in Melbourne operating trams due to success in the most recent tram refranchising.   

Common themes

1. A desire to save money. Getting good value for money should be top of mind for every bureaucrat. So should saving money if there are better uses to which it should be put. But sometimes attempts to do this can backfire. For example the government had a choice to pick different contractors for trains, buses and ticketing who may well have performed better than who we got. Failing operators might have been 'called in' earlier but there might have been a temptation to hold off because proper resolution might involve spending money not budgeted or avoiding making necessary but industrially-unpalatable offsetting savings. Maybe more due diligence on real costs might have prevented the state falling for 'too good to be true' offers? Less naivety over who ultimately bears and pays for risk might also have helped. 

2. Information Technology. There seems to be something about governments and IT procurement that make it very high risk. Both Metcard and Myki were IT-intensive projects that ran over time and over budget with eventual delivery being less than envisaged. And there is a significant chance of history repeating with issues with Conduent's successor to Myki reported in just the last week. While Melbourne is the Australian capital with the most ticketing dramas it's not just us; both Brisbane and Canberra have problems right now. 

3. Internal expertise.  Our heavily outsourced model builds a wall between purchasers and providers. That can lead to those leading purchasing agencies not having much operational experience and giving poor advice to government. My look at the background of DTP executives indicated this could be a risk since few have long-term operational experience in the industry. Private operators are big international companies with many internal opportunities for an ambitious executive. Or they might jump over to another private operator or shift to consulting. Hopefully this is something that incoming Secretary Jeroen Weimar is alive to, if for no other reason that he himself has a much stronger background in public transport than the current secretary.  

4. Remoteness from the 'coal face' leading to not seeing or denying of problems. This was clearly a problem for the Transdev bus contract; I regard it as a contract management failure that problems were not fixed before Transport Safety Victoria had to intervene. Even the auditor-general was not immune, focusing too heavily on what it cost (a good story with savings obtained) to the exclusion of value delivered (a bad story with uncleaned and, as would later be revealed, unsafe buses) that might invalidate opinions formed from a desktop. Remoteness can also directly cost money, such as DTP losing control of and being deluded over the real extent of bus fare evasion.

5. Sensitivity over what to tell political masters. This is the frank and fearless advice thing. At their best departments use their hierarchy as a means to channel information up to senior management who are thus well equipped to make decisions, give sound advice to the minister and drive improved performance from operators. When performing less well the hierarchy might be a means for good ideas and knowledge from experts in the department's middle levels to be killed off in favour of what they think the minister wants to hear. The latter might seem to work for a short time but problems (and bad news coverage!) just fester and multiply as we have seen with various ticketing systems. It's worth mentioning that the 'killing off' mentioned above need not be a conscious act; leaders may just be poor communicators, ineffective internal advocates or even just be too eager to please. 

6. A management culture too accepting of mediocre performance. One path of least resistance might be to accept mediocre performance and avoid tough conversations with ministers, treasury officials, unions or franchise operators. The latter can spot weakness in DoT/DTP contract management a mile away. They will gravitate to only minimally satisfying contract requirements while maximising profits. As they are private entities with responsibilities to shareholders, I don't blame them for doing what privateers do. But it is also fair for taxpayers and riders to expect strong leadership from the department to encourage a high performance service delivery culture. Rail trouble-shooter Simon Lane argues that there have been times when Melbourne has had this leadership culture and other times it hasn't.    

Conclusion

I've outlined seven significant project bungles whose history is worth studying further for anyone who wants more useful, higher performing and more cost-effective public transport. 

Are there any I've missed? I'm conscious that I haven't covered the consequences of bad hiring choices that lead to mediocre day to day management or priorities. That can include poor judgement and being taken in by fashion. 

The recurring but fortunately now receding fad of flexible route buses or techbro grifter 'mobility as a service' stuff are examples. Both have wasted a lot of peoples' time by diverting attention from delivering the basics of good value good service every day. 

Management attention is limited and to manage means to make choices. Doing the right things and doing things right are both essential.    

Your comments on these are appreciated and can be left below. 

UN 193: Top PT priorities for Prahran and Werribee

Victorians in Prahran and Werribee will elect their new state Legislative Assembly member of parliament in by-elections to happen on Saturday February 8. This is due to the resignation of Greens MP Sam Hibbins in Prahran and the retirement of former Treasurer Tim Pallas in Werribee. 

Prahran and Werribee are chalk and cheese. Seat descriptions and transport needs discussed below:

Prahran

Seat description

Prahran is a densely populated inner suburban seat with an abundance of trains, trams and some buses. Containing a mix of 'old money' Liberals, gay libertarians, young renting professionals and public housing tenants, past elections have been genuine three-way contests between Labor, Liberals and Greens. Significantly, Labor won't be standing this time, with former Labor MP-turned independent candidate Tony Lupton hoping to attract politically homeless ALP voters. There's a slew of other independents and minor parties standing too. Tally Room website candidate list and by-election discussion here.

Of interest to us was that Mr Hibbins was his party's spokesperson on transport. Potentially a fantastic portfolio for an active Greens MP, Hibbins did not make full use of it, especially on public transport service issues under a government with a very contestable record. Instead Hibbins basically spruiked for the electric car lobby and lacked a vision for buses, the nearest and often only public transport for most Melburnians. Few public transport advocates would lament his departure. 

Service needs

Prahran is lucky in that it has not just radial but also cross-suburban train and tram transport. Buses play a relatively minor role but there are some gaps they fill. Key issues for the network centre around upgrading what is already there, with some key priorities being the following: 

* Chapel Street Route 78 tram accessibility and speed upgrade

* Route 246 bus upgraded to run every 10 min 7 days per week

* Getting rid of the 40 minute Sunday morning gaps on the Sandringham line and ensuring that it benefits under the Metro Tunnel timetable later this year (including through-routing to Southern Cross and trains every 10 minutes as per the 2016 Metro Tunnel business case)  

* Improved evening and Sunday morning tram frequencies (starting with getting 30 min to 20 min)

Other upgrades likely to benefit Prahran residents include a second (northern) entrance for South Yarra Station and reviving government interest in the Park Street tram link for tram network reform. 

Werribee

Seat description

About 30km west of the CBD. The centre of an outer suburban growth area transformed by migrant families attracted by the area's affordable housing. Living costs, transport services and infrastructure, schools and health are major issues. The public transport that runs is well used but service frequencies lag the east. Also the area's last major rail infrastructure improvement, the Regional Rail Link, opened nearly a decade ago. Politically Werribee has been safe Labor but, in common with other outer areas, the ALP now relies on preferences due to a declining primary vote. All major parties will be standing in Werribee. The Liberals, racked by leadership issues over Christmas, have only just announced a candidate whose had only a few weeks to get a profile. Independents and minor party candidates will also be standing. Tally Room website by-election candidate list and discussion here. 

Mr Pallas was a member of the Andrews government. Labor's political achievement was turning eastern marginals into safe seats while retaining its north and western heartland despite an eroding primary vote. This was aided by generally weak Liberal campaigning, disunity, ageing volunteers and unfavourable voter demographic trends. Our single member electoral system means that you can have have some primary vote erosion without any seats being lost. However once primary vote percentage gets down to (say) the 30s then there's an avalanche effect where seats fall quickly, especially if there are strong local independents with disciplined preference flows.  

Service needs

Werribee is served by the electrified Metro Werribee line and the diesel V/Line Geelong line. Trains on both are typically every 20 minutes, with a more frequent peak service. Both are very well used but have less service than lines in the east which have a 15 or even 10 minute all day frequency. There are community calls for an extension of rail electrification and new stations such as at Black Forest Road to better serve the growth area of Mambourin. To this end the government announced a Western Rail Plan in 2018 but local sentiment is that the government has done more for the east than the west. 

The bus network was overhauled in 2015 with some incremental improvements since. However local routes mostly operate every 40 minutes off-peak with luckier corridors every 20 minutes. Evening service is limited with 9pm finishes on most routes most nights of the week. Werribee's bus routes are amongst the busiest in Melbourne on a boardings per hour basis. However it has no premium service SmartBus routes, unlike in the north or east. Also substantial areas of new estates, notably Mambourin, have no public transport at all. 

Werribee has not been short of proposals for better trains and buses. For instance the Western Rail Plan from the government and Metro 2 proposals from the Rail Futures Institute for rail.

The most radical bus proposal is that from the UoM Melbourne School of Design and backed by the FOE Sustainable Cities campaign. The concept is a recast bus network with frequent but widely spaced main road routes. Analysis shows it allows many trips to be made faster than now. The main con is that the flexible routes it proposes for local coverage don't have a very good record of success in Wyndham, with its one FlexiRide at Tarneit to be replaced with fixed routes thanks to GAIC funding.  

Still the UoM network and the advocacy for it could inspire a more pragmatic bus network model in Wyndham that delivers a step change for local buses. Ingredients could include: 

a. A genuinely frequent long-hours network based on existing direct routes that is highly promotable
b. Retention of most if not all existing local routes since these are excellent performers relative to other bus routes in Melbourne
c. Improved access to job areas such as Laverton North
d. Coverage upgrades in areas such as Mambourin that have no or limited buses

The above might be more sellable to the government and less disruptive for existing passengers. Another benefit is the potential for it to be staged, meaning benefits can start sooner.   

The frequent centrepiece of such a network model for Wyndham might be "The W", as shown below. 

Three existing routes (150, 170 & 190) could be upgraded. Initially with longer hours and maximum 20 minute waits at any time, and then upgraded to every 10 minutes 7 days. Buses would carry frequent network livery, stops would be bigger and more comfortable and there would be improved information at all stops. Priority with articulated buses could provide a tram-like product better in all respects than SmartBus in the east. 

A rerouted 400 has a weaker catchment so might be less frequent (say every 20 minutes) but there may be opportunities to extend it south, such as to Point Cook Town Centre. The Laverton end of the existing Route 400 could be replaced with new route to Tarneit Station via Laverton North and Dohertys Rd (similar to the GAIC-funded Route 154 Tarneit FlexiRide replacement).    

Supplementing the W could be major upgrades to other key bus routes such as 152, 160, 180, 182, 192, 494, 495 and 497. Services every 20 minutes all week and a midnight finish would make maximum use of the existing bus fleet. That's a big upgrade from now given most of these only run every 40 minutes most times. Together with 'The W' this would provide much of Wyndham within 10 minutes walk of reasonable train and bus services. 

A genuine integrated network also needs improved train frequencies, building on the December 2024 boost to Geelong line weekend services. High priorities here could include earlier weekend starts and upgraded evening frequency on the Geelong line and boosting Werribee Metro trains to every 10 minutes for most of the day (similar to Frankston line now). And on the infrastructure side extending the Werribee line to Wyndham Vale could deliver a station at Black Forest Rd, with a large unique catchment. 

Conclusion

Both Prahran and Werribee will be interesting by-elections. It remains to be seen how much transport will feature in the three or so weeks remaining. It would seem that the Greens will be using both for their 50 cent fare offer while we so far haven't heard anything from Labor and Liberal. However just because something isn't promised by the government in a by-election campaign doesn't mean that it won't happen, with the Route 800 bus in the seat of Mulgrave being an example of success. 

Other Useful Network items are here