Younis quits: Five challenges for the new DTP Secretary

Today's Age is reporting that Department of Transport and Planning Secretary Paul Younis will stand down at the end of the year after 6 years at the helm. We don't know why he's leaving and there has been no official announcement as yet, with the Age relying on advice from an internal email.   

First some background. Mr Younis took over from Richard Bolt who resigned after being left out of the planning for the Suburban Rail Loop. Under Bolt there was Gillian Miles as Transport for Victoria head (one of the many names that staff have worked under due to almost continual restructuring in the transport portfolio).

Before them, when PTV was its own entity, were the three Britishers - Dobbs, Wild and Weimar - all of whom had public transport operational experience (unlike later leaders). Even further back was another in Jim Betts, who will be remembered by staff long after most other Secretaries have been forgotten.   

Younis' time spans three approximately equal periods; pre, during and post pandemic. He came to his position during the heyday of low interest rate-fuelled 'Borrow Big, Build Big' thinking in 2018 when anything in transport seemed possible. Today's environment is different, with the 3 Hs - higher interest rates, health system stress and a housing crisis - dominant. 

In June I described Mr Younis as an introverted civil engineer who hides his light under a bushel. The manner of his departure matches this with news coming out via what appears to be a staff email. Places I'd be looking at for official announcements, including word of the successor, include the premier's media releases and Government Gazette.  
 

The new secretary

Utopia jokes aside, who does the new Secretary need to be?

In one line, I would suggest "a tough cookie who rides the bus". 

The toughness is needed to confront things that Younis didn't, couldn't or was unable to. And the bus riding would help the secretary feel and show empathy with users and passengers.

Younis might have been a 'safe pair of hands' but his time also had some missed opportunities. 

Despite there being unprecedented state funding for transport projects, only a fraction ended up in those that his department directly managed. The big politically-important projects were spun off into dedicated well-resourced delivery agencies like LXRP and SRLA, leaving DTP with the scraps. There was inevitably some overlap but the record shows that integration between Big Build projects and DTP functions like rail timetable or bus reform was patchy and hardly ever happened.

Transport leaders elsewhere deftly used the pandemic as an opportunity to advocate for or reconfigure timetables to favour the new trends in off-peak usage. We got a little of that with some revised tram timetables. But Younis was unable to translate this into outcomes for metropolitan trains on our busiest  or highest needs lines. These continue to have sharp frequency cliffs at important times. 

Despite having a Bus Plan in 2021 (that Minister Carroll made a public release) and a team of people responsible, Younis was unable to make the case to Cabinet or Treasury for it to get 2023 or 2024 state budget funding. It can't all be put down to government parsimony since 2024 was a successful year for the much less resourced #Fix800Bus campaign. However DTP can claim success in obtaining conditional fixed term funding for growth area buses via the GAIC. 

It is known that there are certain bus network inefficiencies that could have been tackled for 'greater good' improvements if the will existed. Some of these were fixed but many big ones remain for the picking.   

If I was Treasury I would mark departments heavily on whether they defended their revenue streams or  had a program to fund improvements from internal efficiencies. Furthermore, I would oppose their budget bids until they did so. DTP cannot necessarily claim to have maximised opportunities here.  

In public transport such actions might have included cutting unnecessary costs (eg looking at administration overheads, getting better value from operator contracts, cutting out unnecessary activities or streamlining the network), minimising losses (eg cutting fare evasion), maximising patronage (through greater good network and service reform, good information and marketing).  

The new secretary needs to be resolute in doing more with less, including offering up ideas to do that to ministers. This includes asking confronting hitherto 'sacred cow' questions, like whether staffing some stations with both internal and PSO staff at night is excessive, with higher evening frequencies a better use for the money. This is just a random example - what's important is that the thinking process must be there. Going the other way, there may be scope for ministers to demand more from the department, and not take 'we don't have the funding' for granted.  

No person is an island. One Secretary (even if they get $500k pa) can't do everything. They need to delegate and inspire. That attracts loyalty and retention of the best people. Such encouragement of initiative and continuity is important for the department to address the performance, quality and efficiency issues that have affected some of its functions. 

Five priorities for the new secretary

1. Sweat the assets / maximise community benefit / frequency first

The recent emphasis has been on building infrastructure. Much less so on working it hard to maximise its community benefits all week. For instance we have removed level crossings and new stations but the trains are often still only every 20, 30 or 40 minutes at important times people wish to travel. Newish stations like Cardinia Rd or Southland haven't yet got complementary reformed bus networks. Ditto for the likes northern suburbs stations like Preston or Reservoir, where buses every 22-24 minutes cannot evenly meet trains every 20 minutes. With many projects now built, maximising asset utilisation may need to take over from new construction as top priority given how tight budgets are now. This is especially so given that (unlike Sydney) Melbourne has let its per capita service fall over time.  

2. Fix bus services / reform the backlog

The cheapest upgrades require internal process reform so that we can get simple stuff done as quickly as we know Perth does. This recent Healesville example shows we can do it, with only the scale and pace lacking. Fixing this requires attention to streamlining processes and building capability in certain areas.  Larger service upgrades will need external funding. This calls for an ability to advocate within government for extra service resourcing, especially noting the cost of living and housing choice benefits of same.

Focus is important. That includes avoiding fads like flexible route buses that distract from what's really important to move the numbers needed. And while not themselves without merit, initiatives like bus recontracting and electrification must never usurp the basics of good service including adequate coverage, direct routes, long hours and high frequencies that are core to growing patronage. 

3. Rebuild passenger confidence / excel with service / expect better from operators

As more projects get completed interest needs to shift to providing good service to rebuild confidence and grow patronage. 'Make service worth paying for' should be the motto. Perhaps unavoidably lines like Frankston have been shut down for so much of the last five years that patronage has suffered as there is no certainty as to whether there are trains or not. Also, as noted above, passengers have got fewer benefits from completed infrastructure projects than they should have. 

Better reliability has been touted as one benefit of removing level crossings and renewing rail infrastructure. However, for reasons unexplained, we have yet to achieve the same operational performance that we had between 2000 and 2003. Success here will be a major achievement for the new secretary if they can pull this off.  

4. Set a patronage target / promote the network 

When was the last time you heard a DTP secretary articulate a patronage growth target for public transport? Or even go on talkback radio to advocate the benefits of taking public transport? Whatever his other skills, the existing  media-shy Secretary has been a terrible salesperson for the network.

There is a risk that seeing this from the top sets the tone for the rest of the department and expectations of its people. Although a franchise operator can be removed for poor performance, there is not that same accountability if DTP performs its functions poorly. Passenger information, including for disruptions, real time for buses and public holiday service arrangements, are opportunities for improvement as errors and inaccuracies are too common. So is promotion of new or upgraded services, with a tendency to either not articulate or undersell the sometimes substantial passenger benefits.  

5. Defend revenue / Get passengers paying again

During the pandemic (when myki top-ups were removed) DTP lost control of bus fare evasion and has not regained it since (even denying there's a problem). This culture has led to new expectations (including amongst drivers) that make the problem hard to unscramble, especially for Labor governments with affiliated transport unions they need to please. But letting fare evasion go unchecked is costing revenue and public confidence in the competence of network leadership. 

It's not all DTP's fault. Politicians from both sides have fiddled with the fare system for their political gain. This has led to a network with an unfortunate combination of (a) the free tram zone, (b) excessively cheap long distance fares, (c) excessively expensive fares for short trips and (d) a perverse incentive for train travellers to fill station car parks early (due to the single-mode Early Bird fares). It could be argued that this, plus sometimes lax fare enforcement and poor service levels, has led to a culture of 'you pretend to pay while we pretend to provide a service' amongst some. 

As you can see there's lots to do here with a challenging fiscal outlook and a state election in 2026. But there's also a lot of opportunity to make the most of our (now enlarged) infrastructure. Let's hope the government chooses wisely so we get the right secretary to provide the leadership needed. 

UN 184: The faster Caulfield - Rowville transport we can have now

The state government is currently consulting on nine suburban activity centres that it has identified as being appropriate for higher density housing. These are the same centres that I suggested some transport upgrades for last year.     

With the consultation comes some increased detail on each centre. Today I want to discuss Chadstone as this is the only centre that isn't on a strong radial train or tram line. There's lots of bus routes but their hours and frequencies are limited. You can read specifically about the government's housing plans for Chadstone here. 

Now let's go back a bit. 

Long-term Melbourne residents and planning followers will remember Melbourne 2030 in the early 2000s. This was predicated on denser development around major activity centres. You can see evidence of this around centres like Moonee Ponds, Box Hill and Carnegie. As pointed out at the time, Melbourne 2030 did not have a serious funded transport infrastructure and service program attached. 

This is why centres like Moonee Ponds (in Transport Infrastructure Minister Danny Pearson's seat)  have off-peak train service levels basically unchanged from 25 years ago. Box Hill and Carnegie have fared better. But with 30 minute gaps still common for both trains and bus routes, service levels at key times continue to lag below what is required to reasonably live without a car and address local traffic congestion.  

Today's suburban housing activity centre plans also don't say much about the transport infrastructure or services they need. But Chadstone's has this little note below pointing to a route along Princes Hwy. 

Promises and proposals

This investigation is the latest word we have on the status of the Caulfield - Rowville tram. that was promised by premier Daniel Andrews on 10 April 2018. The Suburban Rail Loop, which would also serve Monash University Clayton, was announced a few months later and stole all the limelight. 

With the tram promise floundering, what you might call the 'big end of town' in the south-east (ie Chadstone Shopping Centre and Monash University) is backing a trackless rapid transit scheme between Caulfield and Rowville. The proposal claims to be twice as fast as existing bus services and would connect with intersecting transport services including the Suburban Rail Loop at its Monash station. 

Locals have a right to be sceptical whether it will happen or not. At the Rowville end politicians have a long history of over-promising and under-delivering on transport. Budgets for the State government's existing suite of major projects are blowing out while the Federal government's cap on overseas students will likely stymie Monash University's growth.  

However something in transport does need to be done. Not only to support the housing proposed but also because existing bus services are not up to the job, even for current land use and population. I discussed Chadstone's transport needs in 4 steps here but didn't fully cover the Princes Hwy transport corridor, especially a direct connection with Monash. The most cost-effective way to do this will be today's topic.      

Route 900 SmartBus

The last big radial public transport upgrade in the Chadstone area was the commencement of the Route 900 SmartBus in 2006. This soon became Melbourne's most productive SmartBus route with strong usage on all days of the week. It, like both the promised tram and the advocated trackless route, already operates between Caulfield and Rowville. 

Despite its good patronage performance, the 900 doesn't operate to the frequency or speed standards one would expect of a premium public transport corridor. For instance there is no Sunday service after 9pm and there are 30 min gaps between trips on weekends and evenings. Same for the other routes. 

That's not an inherent problem with buses; it's just that low frequency and short hours is a choice that  Melbourne's made for the last 60 years or so, with service on even our 'premium' SmartBuses trailing equivalent routes in other cities, especially on weekends. 

Existing travel speeds

Travel on Route 900's western portion, between Caulfield and Huntingdale, is unacceptably slow. A trip between these locations takes around half an hour. That's via the most direct road distance of about 8km or the actual bus travel distance of around 11.5km. In other words around 20km/h. 

You could blame buses being held up in car traffic for some of this, especially on busy weekends around Chadstone. But there are two other key reasons for Route 900's slowness. These are: 

* The route's travelled kilometres between Caulfield and Huntingdale, which as noted above are about 40% longer than the shortest road distance possible (via Princes Hwy and Huntingdale Rd)

* Further exacerbating the above, the very high number of turning movements. I get at least 9 between when the bus leaves Chadstone to when it leaves Huntingdale station. 

Unless it's the 82 in Maribyrnong (for historical reasons) there is no way that a Caulfield - Rowville tram would be built with so many turning movements. The so-called trackless rapid transit proposal shows just two turning movements between Caulfield and Rowville in its animation. 

TRT's PR video conveys the impression to lay viewers that high speed requires their special vehicles (and associated depot and maintenance costs). This is not so. With more direct routing and appropriate priority over other traffic conventional buses can go faster too. That could deliver speed and frequency benefits now for negligible cost, while establishing the corridor for a potential light rail for improved future capacity. If it's a choice between 'grab what you can now' or 'push it into the never-never', I'm in the first camp.    

A more direct, faster Route 900? 

Below is one concept for a faster Caulfield to Rowville Route 900 bus. I'm not saying it's the best idea out there. Like anything there will be 'swings and roundabouts'. But its advantages with regards to speed, frequency, implementation time and value for money would likely make it a front-runner for any state government investigation of the corridor's transport needs. And it's scalable in that you can start with existing buses and stops now, with upgrades later as needed. 

The pros

* Faster travel by making 900 about 2km shorter and removing 8 turns. Maybe 10 min off all up. 
* Provides a fast direct alignment for Chadstone Activity Centre that more housing is proposed in, including to Metro Tunnel trains at Caulfield

* Connects the south-east's two biggest trip generators with a direct driving-competitive route that delivers early speed and frequency benefits of various tram and trackless transit proposals
* Scope to deliver more service for no extra cost due to abovementioned run time savings. The top candidates would likely be (a) 10 min interpeak weekday service (b) 15 minute weekend frequency and (c) operating hours that better match trains (notably Sunday evenings). 
* Complements needed wider network upgrades involving routes such as 630, 802 and 804. 
* Makes it no longer necessary for Monash to run its Caulfield - Clayton intercampus bus, with a potential partnership to use the money saved to upgrade other Monash-serving routes instead

The cons

* Oakleigh Station loses buses to Monash and Chadstone as 900 no longer goes via there
* Huntingdale Station loses bus frequency to Monash as 900 no longer goes via there
* Rowville loses connection to train at Huntingdale as 900 no longer goes via there
* Overlap of several routes along a portion of Princes Hwy at Oakleigh East

It's worth noting that some of the above cons can be mitigated by upgrading or reconfiguring other routes. For example: 

* Oakleigh station already has many routes to Monash and Chadstone, including 800, 802 and 804. In addition Route 903 operates to Chadstone. When taken as a group they operate frequently on weekdays. Operating hours and weekends are an issue but that can be fixed, as discussed here for 802 and 804, with wider benefits extending as far as Dandenong.
 
* Huntingdale station already has good weekday frequency to Monash via the 601 university shuttle. The 900 provides weekend service that the 601 doesn't. However the loss from removing the 900 can be offset by upgrading the popular Route 630 to run every 20 minutes or better 7 days per week with longer operating hours. This also has wider gains, in this case west to Ormond and Elwood. 

* A rerouted Route 900 would mean that Rowville passengers would no longer be able to change to a train at Huntingdale. Instead they'd need to remain on the bus to Caulfield. However they would gain from improved Route 900 frequency and better train connections. There is also scope for other Rowville area bus network reform that would provide much more of the suburb with bus connections to nearer stations (as the current 900 only covers a fraction of the suburb around Stud Park). A less radical variation could retain the 900 route via Huntingdale but, with more turning movements, directness and travel time would be worse. 

It is true that the cost of a direct Princes Hwy Route 900 is that it overlaps portions of existing routes. However the existing Route 900 also overlaps other routes between Oakleigh and Huntingdale and the new overlap is less costly when measured in minutes. In any event it would only be a temporary problem; when the Monash SRL station opens Route 900 could be run via Ferntree Gully Rd as per the Trackless Rapid Transit proposal.

On another matter, if it is considered important that Burlington St retains a frequent service then 802 and 804 can be moved there from parallel Atherton Rd with little change in kilometres operated. This is not an important change and may only be done if wider bus network reform involving the poorly used 704 and the 742 (that inefficiently overlaps with much of the 693, with which it could be merged) is attempted. 

Conclusion

Better transport for the Chadstone / Monash area is highly desirable given the area's current intense activity and the expectation of more, especially with regards to housing.

There is interest in improved transport, as demonstrated by the various schemes promised or proposed. What perhaps isn't there is the will to commit money to large capital works, with the risk that nothing will get done for a decade or more for this corridor.

However this should not be regarded as an inevitability with a highly cost-effective bus concept that complements both the Metro Tunnel and the Suburban Rail Loop discussed here. Furthermore, while providing good speed and service now, it could set the groundwork for a future higher capacity mode when the capacity need arises.    

Wish to comment on the housing activity centre plans? You have until September 29 to do so. 

Index to other Useful Network items here

Book review: Without Delay by Simon Lane (2nd edition)

 

It's rare that transport industry practitioners write full-length books on their trade, especially those with something to say about the Melbourne scene. Books are more likely to come from academics instead. James Murphy's The Making and Unmaking of East-West Link and A Very Public Solution and Transport for Suburbia from the late Dr Paul Mees are examples. 

Academics and their students may also present research via papers or at conferences such as ATRF. Other parties that have recently published research or advocacy material on transport include Committee for Melbourne, Climate Council, Infrastructure Victoria and the former Transport and Cities Unit of the Grattan Institute. And historical material may appear from enthusiasts-practitioners via organisations such as state bus and coach societies or the Australian Timetable Association.  

DTP bureaucrats, transport operators and to some extent consultants are more constrained in what they can say. So a book appearing from one is a special occasion, often delivering a perspective you won't find elsewhere. 

Intended audience

Without Delay is by a rail manager for rail managers. But safety regulators and franchise managers should read it too. Especially those in this state given its pointed comments about them near the end. 

Advocates, enthusiasts and those interested in efficient public service delivery more broadly may also benefit. Though beware; you are not its primary audience. Hence Without Delay has jargon, abbreviations but no glossary. Neither is there an index. So it's best read with a highlighter in hand for easier later reference. 

The author

Who is Simon Lane? You could call him an international rail trouble-shooter. Brought in when service delivery is poor and there is a desire to do better. Or there's a major event coming when trains absolutely have to run properly. Notable Australian experience includes Melbourne's Met Trains under Minister Alan Brown (1994-1997) and the period leading up to and including the Sydney 2000 Olympics,

Later he was asked by the Victorian Minister for Public Transport to review Melbourne's poor train performance during the hot 2009 summer. After Connex lost the franchise to MTM he became interim Chief Operating Officer in 2010-2011 before Singapore beckoned.  

Like many rail managers in Australia, Lane hails from Britain. If you've wondered about that, it's not just our better weather and wages; he explains that Australia and (perhaps surprisingly) Singapore have been suckers when it comes to hiring senior managers who don't meet that country's qualification requirements (p60). That we expect train drivers, signallers and technicians to be qualified, but not senior managers, is one theme of the book. 

Importance of statistical analysis

What are some other Without Delay tips? 'Stretch targets', even those thought impossible, are important. Rail managers may know but not understand the network, especially its vulnerabilities and where it can be improved easiest. Timetable people may blame rolling stock people for faults and vice versa.

To get the truth on what to fix first it's essential to use data to ascertain where delays happen and their real causes. You can play along at home with (some) of the former through Track Record's interactive dashboard. Or you can go back through old annual reports (like I did in 2006). Such a statistical approach is essential to identify the lines with the worst performance, with some groups performing better than others. Variability is also important. When improvements from one initiative (eg fixing train doors) become discernible there is less 'noise' in the numbers, making the next problems to fix stand out. That gives useful guidance for the following year's work program.   

Attend to common faults

While major network meltdowns (like Oaks Day 2008) get the most publicity, it's the common everyday faults, such as might arise from fragile timetabling, operational sloppiness or unreliable train doors that contribute most to mediocre daily performance. Lane says that too often this is accepted in a culture of 'learned helplessness' that accepts achieving a franchise target as 'good enough'.

This can be exacerbated by a desire (arguably an obligation) for a franchisee to maximise shareholder profits rather than provide the best service it can be - ie risks and delays as low as reasonably practical). It takes two to tango, so this mediocrity can only happen if the network owner/franchise manager (in our case the state government through DTP) is too accepting. 

Accountability

Past Melbourne on Transit articles (eg this, this, this and this) have noted the 2003 - 2010 fall, the 2011-2014 rebound and the slow 2015 - 2019 decline in metropolitan rail's operational performance. 

Who is at fault? Lane said that all but one of the eighteen ministers he has encountered have been open to his advice (p339). Franchise operators are legally bound (by Australian corporations law) to put their shareholders first (p309). This puts the onus on the contract owner (ie DTP) to uphold asset stewardship and operational performance. Any slackness is quickly noticed and exploited by the operator, who become masters at knowing what they can get away with ('the normalisation of deviance') and in pleading mitigating circumstances.

Noting the post 2015 deterioration, he said that today's contract managers were too tolerant, and those of the late 1990s would have driven better performance such as was actually achieved as per graph below (p311).  

Would-be rail managers (whose role should be to build systems that endure after they leave - described as the 'flywheel effect') are encouraged to seek qualifications and avoid what Lane calls the 'amateurish good bloke' theory of management. Reading inquiry investigation reports for air, sea and rail disasters is also essential - these have lessons that apply for reliability as well as safety.

The three cultures

There is a focus is on avoiding 'loss of control' events through reference to a 'three culture model'. The three cultures roughly correspond to 'bad', 'mediocre' and 'good', with the bad one being described as 'denial or professional recklessness'.

Falling in to this category, according to Lane (p218), was the deterioration in Melbourne train performance from 2004 as the then government blamed the private operator before eventually acting (but too late to electorally save itself in 2010). Lane was particularly critical of 'Meeting our Transport Challenges' (wrongly cited as 2007 - it was actually 2006) as its rail projects, including Dandenong's third track, did not boost available train paths. Based on Lane's classification, I would count fare evasion on Melbourne buses as a more recent sustained 'loss of control' event, including some denial as described here.  

'Administrative or professional negligence' was the second culture. This is what Lane encountered in 1994 (p229) when starting in Melbourne. The difference between this and the first culture was that shortcomings here were less blatant and needed a skilled person to see. There was also an appetite, though not necessarily the understanding required, to improve. MTM's cessation in performance improvement after the 2012 rebound (and the slow decline after) is also cited here (p230).   

Third and best is the 'high performance culture'. Lane says that Met Trains was up to this level by December 1997 (p237) with peak train punctuality close to 95%. Unfortunately there's only a paragraph on this, though other references to this era appear in the book. As the book traces the author's experiences there's significant gaps. For example I'd have liked to have read much more on the 2011-2012 performance revival (which contemporary Melbourne readers and managers will remember better). 

Government versus franchising

Given his background, my expectation was that Lane would prefer a privatised franchise model. However his conclusions are based on evidence that shows the state-run rail networks of Perth, Sydney and Brisbane are performing better than Melbourne's franchised model on reliability and customer satisfaction. Although he didn't mention Brisbane's poor patronage performance, poor frequency and (arguably) less efficient staffing practices compared to say Perth.

In relation to franchising, if you are going to do it he suggested the Network Owner (ie DTP) give franchisees more autonomy in how they run a good service, but being firmer on them in performance demands. 'Partnerships', such has become the fashion, have lead to blurring responsibilities, poor accountability and overstaffing. Page 310 says that the pre-franchising Department of Transport (ie circa 1999) had 25 staff compared to 1200 now. 

I would like more evidence of like-for-like comparisons before accepting this statement on departmental staffing. This claim is not unlike that from the late Paul Mees who said that the department was grossly overstaffed and said that it could manage with about 30, as he said was the case in Zurich. Plus there were some important transport functions in 1999 that were just not done, eg maintaining bus stop signage and timetables (which had to await Metlink's arrival in 2004 to happen), not to mention timetable data, websites and journey planners.  

Infrastructure priorities

While most of the book is about 'O and M' (jargon for operations and maintenance), there is a section on planning for new projects. Unlike the current 'infrastructure-first' state government, Lane is a 'sweat the asset / service first' man. Big builds are the last resort, done only after possibilities such as boosting frequencies, adding more carriages or modernising signals have been been exhausted. 

He notes that some major projects (including metros in Sydney and Melbourne) are marginal or negative BCR. Rigour would be improved if proposed projects were subject to detailed pre-feasibility studies and were compared against good quality options, rather than against what he said were rail's equivalents of nails, broken glass or manure, as in this Goodies clip (which the book frequently quotes). 

Something the book doesn't capture, but which could be a problem is that administrators tend to be able to only juggle a few balls at once. In our case it is possible that, without special attention, our large building program risks distracting attention from operating the service well, especially on lines where replacement buses are the rule rather than the exception. That has impacts on patronage and fuels a 'tyranny of low expectations'.   
   

What I would have liked

Without Delay gives rare insights from an industry practitioner. It is worth purchasing for this reason alone. Especially if you're a problem solver who prefers raw to varnished. 

The second edition had improvements over the first. But if a third edition was to come out then better editing is needed. Might I be so bold to say, by a professional, not an amateur. This is to avoid the current edition's (a) heavy repetition, (b) use of jargon and abbreviations (with no glossary), (c) appearance of some factual errors (including the Goodies skit dog food options), (d) spelling mistakes (including both American and English on the one page), (e) better quality/more readable diagrams and (f) need for more detail in some case studies presented.

Better editing would also return its cost by making Without Delay accessible to a wider audience including  advocates, academics, policy analysts, administrators and media. Many such people will not have  direct industry experience but may still be influential in advisory or franchise management roles.

Notwithstanding its limitations, which are shared by many (almost) self-published limited-market books, I still recommend Without Delay as an essential read for anyone interested in safe and reliable rail operations. And, if it's any comfort to those struggling, I found the last half an easier read than the first half.  

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