I'll cut to the chase right now. You must buy this book.
That's if you have any interest at all in how Melbourne transport projects happen.
Or, in this case, get so close to happening and then don't.
The Making and Unmaking of East-West Link started as James Murphy's Melbourne Uni PhD project. Unlike some other such endeavours it has both academic and broader public interest. Hence this book.
It's a sort of whodunnit.
Who was responsible for getting modern Melbourne's most controversial toll road project on the construction agenda and then off it?
Was it political leaders? Was it bureaucrats? Or were community outsiders decisive?
I'm not going to tell you here. Instead buy the book. If you do so you'll get fresh insight into the anarchic world of transport planning in Victoria, the weakness of certain departments who outsiders would assume had control and the key role of policy entrepreneurship in an institutional and strategy vacuum.
All this has lessons for people wishing to get transport projects, whether roads or PT, onto the agenda. In the case of East-West Link, the Coalition had assumed office, ditched Labor's 2008 Transport Plan, but didn't have a full plan of their own.
Organisational restructuring had weakened the Department of Transport, spinning off roles like public transport planning into the new PTV while retaining residual transport roles in a less focused Department of Transport, Planning and Local Infrastructure.
The world wasn't waiting while these agencies, which were supposed to plan the network, were preoccupied with their own organisational charts. Nature abhors a vacuum. This turmoil and the lack of an official plan created openings for policy entrepreneurs like Ken Mathers. Working from within the relatively obscure Linking Melbourne Authority, he built 'Roads Club' stakeholder and government support for East-West Link.
Government support became emphatic after Denis Napthine, who wanted something bold for the 2014 election, became premier. This was necessary but not sufficient for East-West Link to happen as later events, involving ultimately decisive local council, community and then Labor Party opposition, proved.
Today
East-West Link may (at least now) be off the table but the themes continue. Last year the Auditor-General found that Victoria lacked an overall transport plan though it had many specific plans. One of those smaller plans was Victoria's Bus Plan. It usefully diagnosed problems but is better viewed as being a 'plan for a plan' as there is no budget, implementation program nor the all-important lines on maps.
In years of yore train and tram heads like Harold Clapp or Robert Risson, were household names. Post-franchising, some private operator chiefs like Andrew Lezala were known. PTV's Ian Dobbs also had a profile with frequent media appearances. Some past V/Line CEOs were more infamous than famous. But these days it's unlikely that more than two passengers in a hundred could name the Department of Transport's secretary (Paul Younis if you're wondering).
This has not been for a lack of media coming out of the transport portfolio; rather it's because under this government initiatives projects like level crossing removals and the Suburban Rail Loop seem to have their own arrangements (including generous PR and social media budgets). These projects appear to have wide discretion over what gets built and design decisions.
While it undoubtedly includes some who understand connectivity issues, collectively the Department of Transport has not always been able to effectively take a network view and veto bad design choices. For example in 2022 we are still building stations (like Keon Park) that lack platform entrances on both sides of main roads to enable easy no-cross connections to Principal Public Transport Network bus routes. And, at a bigger scale, the proposed Suburban Rail Loop appeared more stand-alone than integrated with poor connectivity with intersecting lines being a recurring theme of EES submissions and hearings.
While the organisation names are different and we're discussing different projects, pre-election 2022 has some parallels with pre-election 2014.
Like 2014 we don't have something that the Auditor-General considers an overall transport plan under the Transport Integration Act 2010. Unlike then though we don't have a vacuum in major projects. Some are so big that the Andrews government parades them to justify its record. Its supporters, from Minister Jacinta Allan down, say that its 'Big Build' agenda constitutes the plan. Detractors, who tend to be sticklers for orderly planning processes, beg to differ, pointing out the risks and opportunity costs of such aggressive project-based-planning.
Although there has been at least two major bouts of restructuring since, the Department of Transport still comes across as weak, both in the public's mind and in its delivery capability. Telling examples of the latter include it taking over two years to start even a minor new bus route after winning budget funding and recurring issues with data accuracy on the website and at station bus information displays). DoT has a bus network reform team (to develop the BRIPs) but I'm not sure how well this is integrated with existing planning areas (who work on upcoming changes) and FlexiRide (which appears another world, not always integrated with the existing network).
In contrast the project delivery arms (eg LXRP) appear stronger in terms of public recognition and delivery ability (albeit imperfectly in aspects like bus and active transport connectivity at some sites). Certainly the marketing budget and effort for projects (that are obvious to everyone) far exceeds that for often beneficial (but less obvious to non-users) network and service frequency upgrades.
Another indication of DoT's weakness may be a lack of internal confidence and/or control from above that keeps it on a short leash. The lack of a substantial implementation program in the Bus Plan indicates an unwillingness to propose even low-cost upgrades (even in vague corridor form) before full funding is found.
In contrast funding matters never stopped highway authorities having their proposals published in the Melway and thus getting them accepted as an inevitability (which attracted funding). Neither does it stop SRLA today.
To repeat what I've said before, if a transport plan doesn't have lines on publicly available maps it neither qualifies as real, captures the public imagination nor can drive political agendas (like the 1969 freeway plan so successfully did and the SRL might well do so currently).
Hence some of the conditions described by Murphy nearly a decade ago remain so today. That includes the lack of an overall transport plan and a weak Department of Transport. Political and organisational support around specific projects is strong but resourcing rapidly dissipates away from them. This includes critical gap areas like intermodal connectivity, active transport, all-day service levels and bus network reform. Thus now, like then, at least a partial vacuum exists in important areas. Progress is painfully slow (and sometimes backwards) despite high benefit cost ratios that would put almost any major project to shame.
Time for optimism in 2022?
One could be pessimistic. But this year I'm not.
Higher interest rates, ballooning construction costs, widening government budget deficits and a degree of public fatigue may make mega projects harder to promise and fund in 2022 than they were in 2018. Candidates and parties preparing for November's state election will however still want something to offer.
Offering that something in just a handful of marginal seats won't cut it these days. Major party loyalty is decreasing, with big swings in formerly safe seats. We got a taste of this in 2018 in western Melbourne seats like Melton and Werribee. 2022's federal results saw 'teal' independents taking formerly safe inner Liberal seats along with big collapses in Labor's primary vote further out. People in many of the latter areas are currently facing cost of living pressures, notably in food, fuel and mortgage interest rates. The federal results should be a warning sign that their votes may be up for grabs in the state election too.
All this is where suburban public transport services can come in.
Making trains and buses practical for more trips can certainly aid cost of living pressures as driving and car ownership costs are reduced. Upgrades can be low cost and distributed over a wide area. A package that delivers worthwhile bus reforms in most seats could cost maybe $100 million per year.
Not much more is needed to slash maximum waits at many train stations in Melbourne's outer east, north and west with a second stage delivering widespread 10 minute frequencies.
These are great value initiatives compared to the multiple billions that would be needed for slower to build infrastructure whose benefits are more narrowly concentrated. Popular support for improved public transport, especially amongst the majority who rent or are paying off a home, is also strong according to surveys.
If you're interested in the possibilities then The Making and Unmaking of East-West Link is essential reading. Why? It talks about the role of 'policy entrepreneurs'. Ken Mathers cited as an example. An earlier version of this part of the book appeared in The trials and tribulations of Ken Mathers, policy entrepreneur (2020 journal article).
While Mathers did not succeed with East-West Link, his approach to winning support for a project in a polity (a) without a strong transport plan, (b) with a weak or fragmented bureaucracy and (c) with urgent political needs due an upcoming election could be instructive. That's because all three remain so today.
An anarchic transport policy space with formal leaders seemingly unable to fill the gaps could well suit a fresh round of policy entrepreneurialism. It could apply to public transport services just as Mathers tried with roads. Implementation would need political and government support but the initial spark needn't come from within it. Indeed it probably can't as processes strictly separate bureaucrats from MPs and (especially) candidates. Especially during the 'caretaker' period.
While people might consider buses unsexy and not think there's much ribbon cutting associated with launching a more frequent train timetable, you also won't get the opposition that potentially disruptive megaprojects can attract (fatally in E-W Link's case).
A 'service first' transport agenda could benefit any side that chooses to run with it. Non-Labor parties and independent candidates can fairly exploit this government's past lack of interest in extending even minimal 7 day service to buses, especially in 'taken for granted' safe Labor areas whose votes are now up for grabs. And Labor MPs and candidates (not all of whom have local connections) can advocate for overdue improved services to revive their image as a force for community good (which has taken a beating due to widely publicised internal factional wars).
Unlike certain social issues, on which bitter divisions exist across (and especially within) parties, improved public transport is neither ideological nor divisive. It can be comfortably advocated by all sides. Benefits are dispersed. And improvements can be fashioned to target today's cost of living issues with expedited roll-out (provided DoT's delivery capabilities are improved).
Useful public transport services change lives and helps people achieve their dreams.
If you sniff political opportunity for better transport in this election lead-up then The Making and Unmaking of East-West Link can get you thinking as to how.
Buy yours from bookshops around Melbourne or via the link below.
(Note: I get a commission from sales via this link. No extra cost for you.)
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