Are you a hankerer or a modernist?

I have a theory that there are two types of people around public transport in Melbourne: hankerers for the past and modernists.

Hankerers pine for an era when trains were government run, trams had conductors and buses were all run by family companies with a handful of routes (no doubt with different liveries). They write columns for The Age bemoaning the loss of tram conductors and how much better things were in the good old days. They exist in enthusisast groups or write on internet discussion boards. If employed in the industry they may occupy non-managerial positions like drivers, signallers and station staff. Some hankerers are even too young to remember the real past and live in an imagined past. Or they don’t remember the bad bits, eg the past lack of Sunday service or the sparse timetables of former branch lines (like Mornington which today receives buses every 20 minutes until 10pm seven days per week).

Hankerers may have an intense interest in a single mode and don’t always see the system as a network or accept different roles for different modes. For example they may advocate new orbital railway lines along routes where improved buses would deliver similar results for less. Neither are economic concepts such as social utility and opportunity cost their strong point. They may view modernists as bureaucrats and accountants. Like the future the past is a moving feast and there are no doubt hankerers who still vouch for the superiority of steam. Or parcel vans with conductors running between trackside factories that closed 40 years ago!

Modernists see themselves as rational and hankerers as deluded or merely backward. They dominate policy and management. Transit geeks with IT degrees seem to be modernists, as are many who’ve experienced systems overseas. Almost anything recently that has been done, from automated ticketing, station destaffing, rail franchising, unified signage and IT applications like SMS alerts, Tram Tracker and online journey planners have been modernist projects.

I should disclose that I lean towards the modernists, although not uncritically so. I laud reform like removing train guards or tram conductors if frequencies are doubled with the savings. Similarly deleting a quiet former munitions factory route plied by the ‘brown bus’ does not worry me if it frees resources for a parallel main route run at clockface frequencies harmonised with trains. I am more ambiguous about level crossing removals. They are expensive but may be a corollary to increased train throughput. Occasionally they are done well (Nunawading) but they mostly introduce urban blight (Huntingdale, Oakleigh, Albion or Sunshine) or an isolated platform waiting environment (Elsternwick or Boronia).

However I suspect that in being a modernist I form a minority. At least in this city, if the letters pages are anything to go by, vocal opinion favours the hankerer over the modernist.

Why is modernism in public transport a minority sentiment? There could be several reasons. Even if you’re under thirty you may still remember tram conductors and staffed smaller stations, provided you grew up here. Then there’s the track record. Service reliability and ticketing issues have sullied the standing of modernist projects like rail franchising and three successive new ticketing systems. The linking of scratch and Metcard ticketing with reduced staffing in the 1990s only added fuel to the hankerer’s ire. In contrast later gains such as Sunday buses, text alert services and extended concession ticket eligibility, seem to have (perhaps unfairly) been less influential in the public mind.

Go over to Perth and it’s a different story. No one hankers for the public transport of thirty to fifty years ago. Instead the popular memory is of the old diesel trains and how electrification and expansion transformed its rails from the nation’s worst to the nation’s best. And beyond the rails, the buses are more logical, legible and connected than they used to be, while the dark shed-like interchanges they served are nearly all gone. Perhaps except for senior citizens, who can still recall trams and trolleys, public transport’s past in Perth was indeed the ‘bad old days’.

An objective comparison reveals aspects of Perth’s public transport less developed than Melbourne’s. For instance stations with customer service (as opposed to security) staff are rare. Ditto for NightRider buses. Perth’s ticket vending machines do less than ours and the versatile daily tickets we take for granted are unavailable in Perth. People there still complain but don’t hanker for the past. Modernism’s hold in Perth is such that old concepts like returning trams are presented in modern terms, for example the ‘knowledge arc’ light rail proposal.

Why do we need modernism if we want better public transport? The main reason is its mindset and willingness to try something new. One old idea that no one uses public transport on a Sunday. Sunday train and tram frequencies doubled, buses gained Sunday service while fares were reduced. Patronage boomed. Similar success stories can be told about cross-suburban SmartBus routes and the NightRider services that were doubled. And again for our bus reviews where implementation improved connectivity and legibility.

More recently we are starting to rethink train operating patterns. Some may lose their expresses or be forced to change trains. Hankerers may be over-represented in opposition. However we cannot afford to turn our back on the ‘greater good’ capacity, reliability and frequency gains that timetable and operating pattern changes may entail.

The same also goes for buses. It was recently related to me how transport consultant Jarrett Walker gives people a certain amount of string to form an ideal bus network at public consultation sessions. The string could either form a network of many infrequent routes or a smaller number of direct, frequent services. This sort of engagement exposes the trade-offs needed and encourages flexibility amongst those who may previously vehemently oppose changes to ‘their’ route.

Good service planners seek to break the stalemate between limited resources and the ability to provide service improvements by reappraising the existing network’s efficiency. If hankerers are too strong (or are perceived as such) service changes will not happen, even where benefits outweight the costs. Managers will be too timid to innovate. ‘No change’ will be the path of least resistance that minimises political pressure. Long term, not changing comes at a cost; eg routes and timetables lagging modern travel needs, as ocurred on much of the Melbourne bus network during the 1990s.

Healthy modernism can be a powerful defence against inertia. Here its contribution is to ensure that public transport is planned in the public interest, patronage is maximised and the best possible network operates for the resources available. While preserving the best of the past is laudable, on no account should it degenerate into an unthinking hankering that stymies worthwhile (but sometimes risky) progress.

Postcard from Tasmania: Catching the 'flea'?

‘The People Movers’, a history of Melbourne’s private buses, had an account describing the multiple operators who plied busy routes in the early days. In those days, when urban route buses were profitable and regulation was light, anyone with a converted truck could skim an established operator’s patronage by trolling their route a few minutes before the scheduled times. These scavengers of the bus world were known as ‘fleas’.

The practice ended as more people bought cars, lowering profits. Governments legislated to remove ‘wasteful competition’. Later still public subsidy came with increased control of the bus industry, which consolidated into fewer hands.

An exception, where buses still pay their way without subsidy, is airport to city bus routes. Typically these are either not provided by the city’s main transport authority (Melbourne, Canberra, Hobart, Perth International) or are all-stops regular routes (Adelaide, Perth Domestic). In Sydney and Brisbane premium fare trains fulfil this role. Because of the requirement to recover costs, fares are typically several times higher than an equivalent length trip on a regular bus or train.

Melbourne’s Skybus, for example, charges $16 for a 20-25km trip to the airport. Skybus has an exclusive contract with the State Government to operate this busy service. Service levels have risen greatly and are now at ‘turn up and go’ frequencies over more hours of the day than any other transit service in Victoria.

At least for its contract term, Skybus is a monopoly. Skybus pays for this right and runs without public subsidy.

Monopolies (in many fields) often get a bad rap for poor service, high prices or both. However Skybus can claim an impressive record of service improvement (frequency boosts from every 30 to every 10 minutes are typical) and strong patronage growth, so the poor service argument cannot be sustained here.

Possibly easier to argue though is that competition can lower prices, Although bear in mind that even here Skybus is not a complete monopoly since there is competition from alternatives eg taxis (especially for couples), airport parking and even the (slower) Metro train + Route 901 trip.

To see competition in practice, lets look at the Hobart to Hobart Airport service. Like Melbourne there is no rail link and no direct regular public transport service.

The big difference with Melbourne is that Hobart has several City – Airport express bus operators.

The Airporter is run by Redline – one of the island's largest regional operators. The fare is $15 for a 20 minute trip, making it similar to Skybus. Hobart has far fewer flights than Melbourne and commensurately less frequent airport buses. Unlike Redline’s other routes, timetables are not published and passengers need to phone up and book.

Challenging Redline is the Ten Buck Bus, which offers a simlar service for 33% less. Service is from nominated city locations (mostly hotels) and a timetable is published. This has services every 60 to 90 minutes and there is no need to book. Possibly this saves the need to take many calls or manage online bookings. Unlike Redline, Ten Buck has no public CBD-based bus terminal, and, as can be gauged from their website and business card, the cheapest possible promotion.

Due to my preference for printed timetables (unless services are very frequent), I opted for the Ten Buck service. I fronted up at the main city stop about 20 minutes early and was surprised to see a Redline bus – also going to the airport – pull up shortly later.

I asked the fare and it was only $8 – about half Redline’s usual rate and 20% lower than the Ten Buck fare (not bothering to ask the question posed on Ten Buck's stop flag – ‘If it’s not $10 ask why’).

Since ‘a bus in the hand is worth….’ and I had plenty of time, I boarded the Redline. A largely unsuccessful lap around the city netted only 2 further passengers and we were off.

It was only after boarding that I realised that I might have ridden a ‘flea’. But on further consideration, was Redline’s sending of a bus to its rival's stop less that of a flea and more that of a troll, seeking to stomp on its ten buck upstart rival? Thoughts from Tasmanian readers welcome!

Headway harmonisation hits the news

Today's Age carries an article making the point that no one is in charge of Melbourne's public transport, especially when it comes to service co-ordination.

It contained several quotes on who is responsible for service co-ordination. The confusion evident only demonstrated that different parties have different ideas of what this means.

The calls for a transport planning agency have largely come about due to the gap between the integration that passengers see in fares and information and the disintegration experienced when timetables do not connect, nor are even planned to connect.

Although the Altona example given in the Age article was not a good one, the point made about the non-harmonisation of bus with train timetables is easily able to be tested.

Earlier this year I checked timetable harmonisation at selected bus/train interchanges in Melbourne and Perth.

The method for assessing harmonisation was as follows:

* If the train ran every 20 minutes and buses ran every 20, 40 or 60 minutes, this was counted as harmonised. However if the bus was every 15, 38 or 55 minutes this was not considered harmonised.

* Public holiday arrangements for buses can vary. Tthe figure given is the percentage that follow train holiday patterns (eg if train runs to a Saturday timetable the bus does as well).

* Routes planned as a combined service (eg 216/219 or 827/828) were counted as one.

* Only daytime off-peak services were examined.

* Of course the above does not guarantee connectivity; a bus every 15 minutes could consistently miss a train every 15 minutes by 14 minutes. However unless services are very frequent headway harmonisation is a pre-requisite for high connectivity. And if frequencies are harmonised it should be easier to optimise times for connectivity at the busiest locations.

The extent of bus/train headway harmonisation was found to be as follows:

Percentage of bus routes harmonised with trains by interchange (Mon-Fri/Sat/Sun/Pub Hol)

Perth - Bassendean: 67/33/100/100
Perth - Canning Bridge: 80/100/100/100
Perth - Murdoch: 100/100/100/100
Perth - Whitfords: 100/100/100/100

Melbourne - Cheltenham: 75/75/75/75
Melbourne - Clayton: 80/33/67/100
Melbourne - Craigieburn: 0/0/0/100
Melbourne - Cranbourne: 43/50/50/80
Melbourne - Dandenong: 78/86/80/56
Melbourne - Frankston: 64/67/70/77
Melbourne - Hoppers Crossing: 100/100/100/80
Melbourne - Huntingdale: 75/0/50/100
Melbourne - Pakenham: 100/0/0/80
Melbourne - Reservoir: 17/17/25/67
Melbourne - Sunshine: 30/20/40/80
Melbourne - Watergardens: 83/83/100/83

The above shows that bus/train frequency harmonisation is almost universal in Perth but variable in Melbourne. Similar comments apply for public holidays, with a network-wide standard existing in Perth but not in Melbourne, where holiday practices vary between bus operators and routes (despite substantial recent progress). Both reinforce public impressions of bus routes as complex and unreliable, contrary to the Minister's recent call to embrace bus travel.

The ability to achieve widespread connectivity in one city and patchy connectivity in another indicate that although we have authorities clearly responsible for policy and contract management (Department of Transport), ticketing (Transport Ticketing Authority), information and marketing (Metlink), the equally important function of service planning remains on the outer, despite its centrality to network usability.

My guess is that Stone's paper will conclude along similar lines. While the Age article doesn't mention this, the conference in Canberra is likely to be the Australian Transport Research Forum. If previous years are any guide, the paper presented today should later become available through the ATRF paper archive which is well worth a read for anyone with a transport interest.

Politicians, Politics and Transport Authorities

A well-attended forum on public transport took place last night at Melbourne Town Hall. Convened by the Metropolitan Transport Forum it featured speeches from the Minister for Transport, Shadow Minister for Transport and The Greens. There was a period for questions after.

Below are several paraphrased statements followed by observations and questions that could have been raised if there was time.

The Greens member recited neither the Minister’s list of projects nor the Shadow Minister’s list of objections. However he briefly mentioned two topics, that of political involvement and management by transport authority, that are worth exploring in more depth.

Martin Pakula (Minister for Transport)

Buses cannot always connect with trains as they operate at different frequencies

This is a fair description of the present for many bus routes (that might run every 38 minutes not not connect with trains every 20 minutes). However such planned non-connectivity is neither an inevitability nor something that can’t be changed.

Given that buses are largely publicly subsidised, and that you oversee a department charged with service co-ordination under the Transport Integration Act, harmonised frequencies and better connectivity should be both achieveable and affordable.

The second reason why buses cannot connect with trains is that they intersect with many train lines. For instance a SmartBus orbital might link ten stations and scheduling connections is impossible

Much like the frequencies we run our buses, the decision to design our premium routes to be long orbitals serving numerous stations was a choice not an inevitability.

Any choice has certain consequences and compromises.

However it is not correct to accept certain consequences as inevitable without acknowledging that they only came about because certain choices (which were not inevitable) were made (in this case the decision to go with long orbital routes rather than upgraded shorter routes serving fewer stations that would be easier to harmonise and ideally co-ordinate with trains).

Terry Mulder (Shadow Minister for Transport)

There will be 2 protective services officers posted at every suburban station (and major regional stations) from 6pm until last train each night. They will be able to escort passengers to their cars.

This was widely reported in the media when announced. But could the escorting service mean that those waiting for a train (going the other way) would not have staff presence for a while? And will security staff go to the trouble of changing platforms to meet every train (where possible)?

The regional fast rail project was a farce

This project did deliver significant service frequency increases to major centres (sort of a follow-up to 1981’s ‘New Deal’ timetable introduced by a previous Coalition government) and patronage has grown rapidly as a response. It also included a component of ‘catch up’ maintenance.

It is true that V/Line on-time performance is often below standard and the bar for longer trips has been lowered. This is often attributed to the suburban network’s unreliability, along which V/Line trains must travel to the city. While punctuality was said to have deteriorated since the RFR services commenced, I didn’t hear anything that convinced me that RFR was the cause of this decline.

Instead his main argument appears to be that his opponents claimed financial mismanagement of projects including myki ticketing, Southern Cross Station and RFR has meant that infrastructure basics that should have been attended to were not.

Greg Barber (The Greens)

Public transport should not be political… it should be run by an accountable public authority

While it is fashionable to argue that ‘things would be better if they were less political’, I am not sure if this is entirely feasible in public transport. This is due to its dependence on public funding for both capital and operational purposes, and hence requires parliamentary scrutiny of same.

As well as not being feasible, ‘non-political’ public transport may not even be desirable. Political decisions can close lines, reopen lines and build new lines. People pushing unfashionable issues envy those whose interest areas are 'political footballs', since at least they're getting air time. And anyone who watched the interviews with Peter Newman on Perth’s rail revival (available on YouTube) heard that the decision to go with train rather than bus for Perth’s booming northern suburbs was a political decision, whereas most industry insiders favoured bus. In this case had ‘non-political’ public transport prevailed the very successful Joondalup line might not have got built.

Also unhelpful is that the term ‘political’ has come to be synonomous with ‘party political’. However there is also a broader politics tied to public organisation (often around community or interest groups) and participation. ‘Political’ could also mean any activity where people comment on a matter of public governance or interest, for instance suggesting where a bus route should go at a public bus review meeting (such as have recently been held).

In some cases the ‘political’ can indeed result in an inferior network and service for most. This could be due to residents not wanting buses in their street, a handful wanting to retain a bus route deviation that makes the service slower and less legible for the majority, or a group who succeeds in obtaining a new route, even though that bus would have met a greater need or attracted higher patronage elsewhere.

Nevertheless there is also a principle that those in remote pockets (even if the ‘remoteness’ is due to a developer’s transit-hostile street layout) should have some service on social equity grounds. This principle is strongly supported (sometimes at the cost of frequency and directness) by the Department of Transport and the Minister (who reiterated the ‘within 400 metres of public transport’ rule last night).

I suspect that many would be surprised at the number of route rationalisations that a business-minded public transport planning authority with a strong charter to maximise patronage for its budget might make. It would certainly mark a reversal of the last few years, which have seen the combination of (a) significant funding of new services, including some new routes that partly overlap existing routes, (b) limited development of headway harmonised timetables and non-SmartBus frequent service corridors, and (c) a reluctance to prune existing routes that may have outlived their justification for existence.

If the experience of Perth’s bus route reform (an ongoing process, but started in earnest in the late 1990s) is anything to go by, a transport planning agency would likely to concentrate on (b) and (c), much of which requires little funding. Funds for (a) would likely be gladly accepted, but this depends on the government of the day (hence the political component will never be avoided).

Evidence such as patronage and patronage potential data is cold comfort to those who have lost their local service, especially if mobility impaired. However some may gain if frequency and connectivity on existing nearby routes is improved. This is why it’s better to delete superflous routes (eg 694) at the same time that existing routes (688) are boosted so that even those left with a longer walk at least gain from higher frequency).

There will be some changes that may never be accepted and there will be constant political pressure for their reversal. This could well come from the very politicians who purported to support an service planning agency.

Although we have few (if any) routes that run on a commercial basis, an approach we could follow is to have most planning on the basis of patronage potential and strategic network importance, along with supplementation for ‘social needs’ routes. These may be less direct and frequent but provide coverage to pockets that cannot be justified as being part of the core network. To a large extent even funding for these would likely be politically determined, proving again that the political cannot (and probably should not) entirely be taken out of public transport.

Real-time information: need for, reliability and management

Real-time information has been a growth area for Melbourne’s trains, trams and major bus routes. Although less important than the service basics of coverage, span and frequency, it is still appreciated by passengers.

Available and accurate real-time information can mitigate the effects of service disruptions, particuarly on the rail network. Some passengers may choose to change or defer their trip, reducing loadings on scarce train replacement buses. And where services are delayed, reliable information allows passengers to make better use of their time, especially if the station or stop is near a shopping area. Advising of services just ahead eases crowding by spreading loadings across several trains (especially if just after a cancellation) or improving the efficiency of transfers at major stations. Hence good real-time information potentially offers substantial operational and customer service benefits.

Real-time information can vary from manual staff announcements to automated position reporting systems that transmit their data to information displays on station platforms or mobile phones. As staff rely heavily on automated systems, this item will concentrate on these.

Printed timetables are simple and reliable

Need

The need for real-time information varies across the network. I believe there are three factors (reliability, urgency and trust) that determine whether real-time information is justified or not.

Consider a suburban bus route that caters mainly for local shoppers. Passengers may not need to connect with another service or be particularly time-sensitive. Buses are almost always on time and cancellations are rare. Printed timetables fairly reflect actual times and are trusted by passengers. Low urgency, high reliability and high trust make real-time displays a frill rather than a necessity, and in any case the per passenger cost is high if installed at quiet stops.

Suburban railways are quite different. More passengers are time-sensitive, expecially those who need to change to a bus or have fixed work times. Even a ten minute train delay can increase end-to-end travel time by 30 or 40 minutes if a bus is missed.

Even allowing for measurement changes, rail delays approximately trebled since 2003. Punctuality declined from 96-97% to around 85% network-wide. It is lower again during peak periods and on long lines served by the troubled Siemens trains (around 75%). Customer satisfaction also fell as patronage rose faster than service levels, causing crowding and delays. High urgency, lower reliability and falling trust all make real-time information a high priority on the train system, second only to network strenghtening measures that increase capacity, frequency and reliability.

In between are the major bus and tram routes. Here heavy traffic and long routes can increase variability. The city-bound routes have a large commuter function, while the orbital routes feed passengers to railway stations and major trip generators. Again real-time information is desirable, providing extra assurance, especially on orbital routes where the bus might be starting its run 60 kilometres away.

The installation of real-time information in Melbourne has generally followed the above priorities. About the only exception is the busier bus corridors that offer above-SmartBus span and frequencies but provide only fixed timetables at stops.

Unreliable information can reflect poorly on a network

Reliability The extent to which an information system is worthwhile depends on whether its content is useful, provided when the passenger needs it, and can be relied on.

Required standards for the latter are high; if 99% of trains run (as is frequently attained in Melbourne) and information displays are 99% accurate then there is just as much chance of the information being wrong as the train being cancelled.

To be fit for purpose, measuring and reporting equipment (such as passenger information systems) should be sufficiently accurate to show variations in the item being measured without introducing substantial errors or uncertainties of their own. Hence in a system where 99% of services run, information systems must be operational and accurate (in this case faithfully indicating which services have been cancelled) for 99.9 to 99.99% of the time.

Information system reliability may fall during service disruptions, but should always be at least an order of magnitude better than the reliability of the underlying service. This increases trust that information is accurate (despite problems the service itself is experiencing).

In Melbourne some SmartBus displays at stops, ‘next station’ displays on the new Siemens trains and ‘next train’ displays at stations are particularly at risk of not meeting availability and reliability standards (in contrast the 1980s AVM system used for trams appears more reliable).

An inconsistent quality of information can make a transit service appear less reliable than it actually is (and undeservedly lower its reputation). And customer complaints are often as much about missing or inaccurate information as the service interruptions themselves. To lessen these risks electronic information displays must be much more reliable than the system itself, and if this cannot be attained they are best removed.

Upgraded equipment is being installed across the rail network

Management

The simplest information display systems (eg blackboard and chalk) require no special expertise to maintain. Lapses in availability (eg running out of chalk) or poor readability (due to bad writing) can be diagnosed and resolved at the local station level. The key issue here is likely to be the extent to which customer-facing staff are kept informed of short-notice service changes and disruptions.

Arrangements for managing automated real-time information are more complicated. Day to day ‘babysitting’ may be done at control desks at bus depots, operations centres or major railway stations. Faults that are beyond the control of stations and can only be fixed by centrally-deployed technically-trained personnel.

Responsibility and accountability are divided (a likelihood in any technically specialised area but accentuated through franchising) and recurring problems may be unresolved defects from two or three operators ago.

A difference between the treatment of service delivery and passenger information is that operator contracts (at least for train and tram) impose penalties for non-performance of the former each month. There is also a requirement for public reporting through ‘Track Record’ and these topics are frequently matters for media comment.

In contrast contracts specify no hard performance standards for real-time information system reliability nor the public reporting of same. While the latter is in line with other cities it does mean that (unlike service reliability) discussions of PID reliability are more anecdotal than factual.

The reliabilty of passenger information systems has a lower profile than either of the above, so is unlikely to the the topic of such special action. Nevertheless it sometimes makes the media when tested and found wanting, for instance during last Tuesday’s disruptions when it was found that the SMS alert system lacked the message sending capacity to promptly advise all subscribers.

Even if public standards existed, the extent to which a new incoming operator could or should be held liable for systems inherited from and unfixed by previous government and private operators is debatable. But in the end it boils down to contractual obligations (which the government drafts, signs, enforces and should be accountable for). Additionally the government can negotiate with the operator enhancements beyond what’s in the contract at an additional public cost (examples being the strengthening of the Comeng train air conditioners or late night services).

Conclusion

The fragmentation of responsibility, only limited accountability, the dependence on IT, the interconnection of various systems at multiple sites (of various origin and age) and use of wireless communication all increase the risk of failure.

Real-time passenger information systems are of only limited value unless they are much more reliable than the services they are intended to monitor and indicate.

If such systems are to be a beneficial part of the transit network (and passengers increasinly appear to want and expect it), increased attention will need to be paid to the management, procedures and technology that make the difference between information reliability and unreliability.

Bedtime reading: Parliamentary Committee on Train Services

The Legislative Council's Select Committee on Train Services has just issued its first interim report. The paper includes the report itself, voting results on its more controversial findings and minority reports from some committee members.

The media soon jumped on to the report’s findings. It was sometimes treated it as if it came from an authoritative source, compiled after a careful evaluation of evidence of witnesses called before it.

Despite the quality of presentations from witnesses (who were all leaders in their fields) a parliamentary committee report does not have the same rigour as (say) an independent inquiry or royal commission (although some processes eg the use of expert witnesses and the invitation of submissions appear similar).

Instead ‘findings’ of parliamentary committees are more likely to be ‘opinions’ supported by the majority of its members. Notwithstanding the effort that witnesses and others made when writing submissions, the broad content of parliamentary committee reports are largely determined by the party affiliations of its members.

This particular committee had a majority of non-government members. Tension between them was sometimes apparent to witnesses who heard some of the asides. These differences intensified through the pages of the interim report (and in particular voting on the wording of findings) that reveal a committee sharply divided on party lines.

Parliamentary committees reporting on controversial matters tend to follow a common script. The government MPs seek to present the government in the best light. The opposition MPs seek to discredit the government, while seeking to remove criticism of their own period in office. And minor party members may use the process to boost their own profile.

The committee’s greatest impact may well have been during the hearings (that generated significant publicity). The previous rail operator opposed an upgrading of the under-rated Comeng train air conditioners and had neither obligation nor funding to do so. However the upgrades, funded by government, were announced as part of the new train contracts signed in late 2009. Also coinciding with the new contracts (which brought in a new operator) was a doubling of track, signal and overhead maintenance expenditure.

As for the future, parliamentary committees tend to have a life of their own. This committee’s scope has extended to ticketing, meaning that public transport will be under parliamentary scrutiny for some time yet.

Ad-hoc versus system design: the cases of railway station posters

Has anyone looked at poster cases at railway stations lately? If so one will see several different designs erected at various times. Careful inspection will reveal that different tools are required to open and update the contents.

This apparently minor detail can give hints about how passenger information is delivered to the platform and the extent to which this represents conscious design or a 'grafting on'. And what is regarded as standard practice for the architect or design engineer might not be favoured by administrators, and vice versa.

Different styles of poster case at stations

An engineer required to design passenger information at stations would likely specify just one design of poster case. All would be a common size so that savings can be made with bulk purchase of materials. And the same basic design would be reproducable in the future if needed for new or upgraded station. Standardisation implies inflexibililty in one area (unimportant to passengers) but permits flexibility elsewhere (to optimise the sequence of information presented to passengers) as posters can be swapped between cases if needed.

As an example, a government-funded station car park extension may have been finished long ago so promotion is no longer needed (the blank case pictured previously advertised this). Or the Myki ticketing system will eventually be as established as Metcard is today, so promotion space for it is no longer necessary. Meanwhile a rail occupation may require numerous additional posters. This is especially if it coincides with public holidays and special events. In such instances, all poster cases at a station are needed to fully inform passengers, and there is a risk that (say) a ticketing poster may occupy space needed for (more important) service information. Having standard poster cases should also cheapen maintenance as the range of replacement parts needed would be less.

The engineer would likely also specify one standard opening tool for all cases at the station. He would know that this assists the railway staff member whose job it is to replace posters as they would only need to carry one tool and not three. Needing only one tool reduces the chance of a tool being forgotten or lost and thus the chance of a poster or timetable not being able to be updated. Hence a simpler system based on one type of poster case accessible with one key should also be reliable than where there is a variety.

Other professionals would also agree, though for different reasons. The architect would want some unity of design, rather than the tacked-on look of many additions to stations. And the chance that non-standardisation causes some cases to be empty would worry the merchant or marketer who sees blank shelves or cases as selling opportunities lost. The passengers, most of whom are not in the above professions, would likely prefer whatever provides the most reliable information when they want it.

A differing perspective may be offered by the manager or bureaucrat. Managers might favour speed and short-run budgets compared to the engineer's standardisation or the architect's design coherence. Well defined goals such as an individual project's delivery may trump broader issues such as the passenger experience or sequence of information received. Those ordering new poster cases may work outside the railways (eg in ticketing) and could even want 'their' posters to have a different style and key. Manufacturing a short run just to continue an existing design may prove expensive, given there are no railway workshops anymore. Thus it could be more rational for managers to order poster cases off the shelf, even if they are a different size or uses different opening methods to cases already on the platform (photos below).

Standard type (used by train operator)

Promotional (used by Department of Transport)

Myki (used to promote new ticketing system)

The photos show that the manager or bureaucrat perspective has generally prevailed over that of the design engineer's. It also indicates that information may be delivered in seperate 'channels' or 'silos' (marked 'railways/existing ticketing', 'transport projects' and 'new ticketing') through different styles of poster cases for each.

This is mostly not too much of a problem. However instances can arise where one area (eg new transport projects today, rail occupations tomorrow) requires more information than poster cases reserved for it. In addition poster placement may not perfectly align with passenger information needs at different locations around the station, and the use of different poster cases may limit flexibility. Also as noted before, having a variety of poster cases and opening tools may have implications for overall system simplicity and thus information reliability.

Bus service upgrades: 'grafting on' versus 'network' thinking

Since late 2006 many Melbourne bus routes have had their operating hours extended and new weekend services added. There have also been new SmartBus routes and revisions arising from local area bus reviews.

Changes can range from extra services on an existing route to an entirely new network in an area. Even small timetable changes to one route can have implications for nearby routes.

Worldwide, the strongest transit authorities take a network view. They see additional resources as an opportunity to provide new connections, remove wasteful duplication and allocate saved resources to needed improvements elsewhere.

The long-term result of such 'network thinking' is a simple and legible network with consistent service levels appropriate for a route or corridor's role.

In contrast, authorities without a network view can miss opportunities for improvement even when given additional funding. This could be for several reasons. Firstly some in transport departments may see themselves more as contract managers than network planners. Secondly, a legacy of route or operator-based planning may obscure a wider view. Thirdly, contractual arrangements in some cities may restrict the ability of transport agencies to reallocate resources between routes and operators.

Whatever the cause for a lack of 'network thinking', the result over time is the same; a system of increasingly illegible, infrequent and overlapping routes as improvements are simply grafted over an unchanged existing network.

The following examples from Melbourne suburbs are offered to show the big differences between 'grafting-on' and 'network' thinking and why it matters for passengers.

Network thinking example 1: Yarraville/Newport/Altona North

Three years ago the local bus network around Yarraville, Newport and Altona North was a mess. The area's routes (429, 430, 432 and 471) only ran during the day and not at all on Sundays. Routes teminated either in quiet suburban backwaters (429 and 430) or at closed railway stations (432). Legibility was poor, particularly in Altona North, where the combined route 432 and 471 took a different route on Saturdays. And to cap it off, only some areas had service to the the nearest major shopping centre at Altona Gate.

The area's bus service review recommended network changes which were introduced during 2008. This may have been easier because the one bus company ran all routes. 429 and 430 were deleted, to be replaced by a new route 431 and improvements to 432, which now served Altona Gate Shopping Centre. 432 and 471 were made more consistent throughout the week and given 7-day service. These provided the area with a much better local bus network and patronage has increased strongly.

Network thinking example 2: Carrum Downs/Frankston North

Frankston North is a low socio-economic residential area located just beyond easy walking distance of Kananook Staion on the Frankston Line. Carrum Downs shares similarities but with newer privately-built homes and higher average incomes. Until 2008 both areas only had very limited public transport, particuarly on weekends. Routes were circuitous and, like Altona North, there were confusing weekend-only deviations and routes.

24 March 2008 brought substantial service increases to the area. Route 901 SmartBus started, providing a more frequent direct service between Frankston, Dandenong and Ringwood. This replaced the slower and less frequent local routes 830 and 831 that went a slower way via residential areas.

Instead local coverage was provided on routes 832 and 833, operating between Frankston and Carrum Downs. These routes run until 9pm 7 days a week and represent roughly a doubling or tripling of overall service (more on weekends).

Interchange with 901 is possible at Carrum Downs, and headway harmonised timetables (15/30 min weekdays and 30/60 min weekends) provide constant scheduled connections between this and local routes. The thinking behind this was to reduce the transfer penalties for passengers who lost their previous direct service to Dandenong.

Connections to adjoining suburbs such as Seaford and Carrum were not included as part of the changes but a new route to the industrial part of Seaford (778) commenced recently.

The Carrum Downs service changes can be regarded as 'Network Thinking' as local routes were altered upgraded on the same day that SmartBus was introduced. This minimised duplication and allowed connections to be planned. Hence, unlike Yarraville it involved a SmartBus as well as local routes. Also although all routes are now run by Grenda Group operators, at the time of its commencement route 901 was shared with Invicta (which Grenda bought).

'Grafting on' example 1: Sunshine/Sunshine West/Sunshine Park

The Wright Street pocket of Sunshine remains served by a complex series of routes that shows what can happen when new services are grafted on without the question being asked about existing services.

Wright Street is mainly served by the Sunshine Park/Sunshine West portion of the 219. The 219 forms a high-frequency pair with Route 216, with the routes overlapping between Sunshine Station, the city and the Brighton area. 216/219 is a direct and well-used route along busy roads that offers above-SmartBus service levels, particularly on weekends and evenings. It is operated by Melbourne Bus Link.

219's Sunshine end is tangled and confusing, as can be seen from the map. On weekdays and Saturday mornings from Sunshine it runs via Hampshire Road, Boreham Street, then back to Wright Street where it terminates at First Avenue. On Saturday afternoons and all day Sunday the route serves Fairbairn Road as far as Talintyre Road, hence missing some stops off Ardoyne Street and east of Hampshire Road. The result is that one set of stops receives a service 5 1/2 days a week while other stops receive service 1 1/2 days of the week (see map below).

Sunshine West is not the most affluent area. It contains families without one car per adult. Such residents near Fairbairn Road would no doubt appreciate the Saturday afternoon and Sunday bus service, as provided by this 219 extension.

However Fairbairn Road is served by another route, the 471, which like 219, also runs to Sunshine. In 1997 the 471, run by Sita, operated six days a week with a limited Saturday service (last bus from Sunshine was 4:10pm). By 2006 this service had improved, with the last departure being 4:50pm. As 471 did not operate on Sundays and public holidays, the Fairbairn Road portion of 219 was still needed to provide a service then.

Further large improvements to Route 471 were introduced on 25 February 2008. This included a 9pm finish, Sunday running and service on public holidays.

Except for some late evening weekend trips, the 471 upgrade made this variation of Route 219 redundant. But the 219 extension was not deleted. Hence it continues to duplicate Route 471 along Fairbairn Road for 1 1/2 days of the week.

The next major service change in the area was the Route 903 orbital SmartBus. This new route started on April 20, 2009. 903 overlaps the 219 along Wright Street east of Hampshire Road (Monday - Saturday morning section) but again the duplicated section of 219 remains intact.

'Opportunity cost' is a helpful concept for the transport planner, and in this case I doubt that retaining the 219 past Sunshine stacks up compared to other uses for the drivers and buses. 219's justification for remaining in the area is weak since almost all of it is within 500 - 800 metres of either 471 or 903.

Running times for the Sunshine to Sunshine West portion of the 219 can range up to 13 minutes. When multiplied by the number of services run per day this represents several driver/bus hours per day that could be put to better use if the service terminated only at Sunshine rather than Sunshine West.

It is all well and good to recommend the deletion of a route portion, as recommended here, but it does not help passengers unless a better use can be found for the resources saved. Examples in the area are not hard to find. Resources saved by terminating 219 at Sunshine could be put towards one or more of the following improvements:

* Increased City - Sunshine running time for the 216/219 between Sunshine and the City (both routes are known to suffer late running due to traffic) to permit better timetable adherance (though bus priority would be better still).

* Upgrading 471 from its non-harmonised 25/50 min weekday/weekend frequency to a harmonised 20/40 min weekday/weekend headway to properly mesh with trains at both Sunshine and Newport.

* If justified, retaining the late weekend evening services provided to Sunshine West, but instead operate as either a 454 or 471 to improve both legibility and coverage.

'Grafting on' example 2: Altona/Altona North

Altona is a coastal residential suburb that in itself contains only local shopping. The nearest large shopping centre is Altona Gate in Altona North. This is linked to Altona via Routes 411 and 412 which are identical except for a section in Altona North.

Route 411/412 has a combined 20 minute frequency on weekdays and 40 minutes on weekends. This is harmonised with trains in the area.

Earlier this year Route 903 between Altona and Mordialloc was introduced. It runs every 15 minutes during the weekday interpeak and every 30 minutes on weekends. It substantially overlaps with 411/412 between Altona and Altona Gate Shopping Centre.

The end result is a very frequent service between Altona and Altona Gate when measured by buses per hour (7 on weekdays and 3.5 on weekends). The weekday service in particular is probably excessive. However because daytime service frequencies are not harmonised to the same headway hierachy (903 is 15/30, 411/412 and local trains are 20/40) the intervals between services vary, reducing the possible gains of the frequent service provided (eg an even 3 buses per hour on weekends with a 20 minute maximum wait is better than an uneven 3.5 buses per hour with 30 minute gaps).

Unlike the case with 219 extension towards Sunshine West, 411/412 cannot simply be deleted as it fulfills other functions in the Geelong Road, Laverton and Altona Meadows areas.

I have no straightforward solution here. For instance, in retrospect it might have been desirable to to have terminated 903 at Newport or Williamstown rather than Altona. The thinking here is to avoid duplication with 411/412 and save resources by allowing part of the 471 to be deleted. Keeping the 903 as is, but truncating 411/412 at Altona Gate doesn't appeal as this removes direct access to there and Footscray from Laverton or Altona Meadows; both areas not known for their surplus of local shopping. Given the 903 is now running, I suspect that the chance of a route change is slim given its profile and popularity.

Of the examples here, this is most comparable to the Sunshine one due to the multiple operators involved and the interaction between SmartBus and local services. The main difference is that a solution is not immediately obvious.

Conclusions

The above comparisons show that where implemented 'network thinking' has delivered both improved system efficiency and better services for passengers. Where network thinking is absent and the 'grafted on' model of service change prevails the result can be less than economical (Altona) or, at worst, be illegible for passengers (Sunshine).

The successful Yarraville area changes only involved one operator and local bus routes only. The successful Carrum Downs changes was slightly different, involving a SmartBus and local routes. While there were initially two operators, one ran all services except a half share in the SmartBus.

The Sunshine case especially may indicate that the presence of multiple operators may make it harder for authorities to take a network view when introducing service changes. Instead the 'grafted on' approach may be followed, with all its attendant inefficiencies and potential lost opportunities.

Snippets from the new train contract

Yesterday's media initially concentrated on 'soft' stories such as the transition to the new rail operators, statements from politicians and train rebranding. However today's service disruptions on some lines reminded us that the basics of running a railway are (and should never be) very far away.

How Melbourne's railways are to be run is prescribed in the Franchise Agreement, Projects Agreement and an Infrastructure Lease Agreement.

While their contents is often too specialised for the mainstream media, long-term these documents will prove more important than the name changes and media conferences in yesterday's news.

What are some of the notable points in the train franchise agreement?

Definitions

The first 48 pages are definitions, conditions and warranties. While there are some odd definitions like the meaning of weekdays (Labour Day on a Monday isn't) it's still worth a skim since tantalising terms like planned delayed services, Platform Assistant Withholding Amount and Maintenance Cost Saving Amount are all defined.

The most discussed definition would be 'on-time running'. This is now defined as within 4:59 minutes instead of 5:59 minutes under Connex. However the Metro website has dual standards; 92% within 5:59 minutes (same as the old Connex standard) and 88% within 4:59 minutes, which depending on the number of trains between 4 and 5 minutes late is pretty close to being the same thing.

'Must Dos'

Page 50 lists performance requirements against what are called 'Year 5 benchmarks'. The two fixed ones are for 'reliability' and 'customer experience'. Further details of reliability standards, their quarterly review and various levels of non-compliance appear from page 76. Information on the 'customer experience' benchmark appear in an appendix but their general aim is to capture some of the 'customer service' facets not in previous franchise agreements.

Page 53 requires the formation of a Network Development Partnership to discuss issues, monitor performance and agree on a Strategic Operations Plan. Both directors of public transport (ie the Department) and franchisees can propose changes to the Master Timetable (more detail starting page 70).

Page 59 discusses load breaches (ie overcrowding). The train operator may receive load breach notices from the department but 6.1(b) states that the department is not obliged to issue them. Generally the department needs to approve reductions in carriage seating capacity. This is topical due to the trial of a reduced seating Comeng train and announcements that new trains will have fewer seats to carry more passengers and improve flow (hopefully reducing station dwell times).

Major events

The use of short (3 car) trains on some lines, especially on weekends with special events, has proved insufficient for passenger numbers. Connex responded by increasing 6-car running on the longer busier lines. Page 63 requires the franchisee to use full consists (if reasonably practicable) on all but quiet shuttles on the ends of some lines.

New Years Eve trains will be provided and will be free, as in previous years (page 66). Shutting down the ticketing system that evening may be required to allow updates (fares normally rise on January 1). As happened in some previous years but not others, the agreement entrenches free trains on Christmas Day (page 67).

Trains and major events almost go together in Melbourne. Melbourne's ability to run big events without hitch is a major part of the city's self-image, at least amongst state and city leaders. Train network failures during major events is regarded very seriously (more so than disruptions to regular commuter travel). Hence significant space is devoted to transport for major events, with notification and planning starting 18 months prior (Page 67).

Timetables

Who determines what's in the timetable? Part 7 (Page 70) discusses this. The Director of Public Transport (ie the Department) can specify requirements in the form of numbers of added or deleted services by time band and even their approximate times. However timetablers are franchisee employees and it is these who shedule the service (noting the need to find train paths, trains and drivers and possibly juggling other services to form and accommodate them). The train operator can also initiate Master Timetable changes but must put proposals through the Network Partnership process and secure the Director's approval.

Provision is made for a Daily Timetable that is different to the Master Timetable to sometimes operate. These may be for planned occupations (required due to track maintenance), for safety reasons, special events or disruptions.

Planned and unplanned disruptions

Service disruptions have risen to prominence as patronage gains made the network more fragile. These are either planned or unplanned, with, as would be expected, tougher requirements for 'planned disruptions' eg buses replacing trains due to trackwork. Page 78 specifies requirements for replacement transport, with the standard being 'reasonable endeavours' and passengers being transported to the end of their 'intended journeys'.

What happens if running is persistently not to the timetable? Page 76 refers to three escalating thresholds: 'call in', 'breach' and 'termination' with judgement made every quarter. The standards have been set that the 'breach' or 'termination' levels require extremely poor performance to be triggered. As has been the case since 2004, these sorts of figures are averaged network-wide, so lines can suffer periods of severe underperformance (eg Stony Point) but this in itself is insufficient to trigger these sanctions if other lines are performing to standard.

Disruptions are sometimes not entirely within the operator's control. Page 79 lists circumstances that if the Director (DoT) agrees then the operator need not be called in, given a breach or terminated. Examples include disruptions due to 'force majeure', 'excluded rolling stock repair' (I'm thinking Comeng air conditioners here) or major projects.

Shuttles and connectivity

Some interesting comments on page 82, which deal with other operators' connecting services and shuttles. This explicitly mentions the Stony Point train and the ferry service to Cowes and French Island. Here there is duty ('reasonable endeavour') to consistently achieve connections.

That same page also requires consultation and co-operation with bus operators regarding facilities and information. However this section is both brief and scrappy; there is no similar requirement to co-ordinate with tram services and specific measures that would assist passengers, such as requiring the display and stocking of bus timetables at stations are omitted.

Clause 7.18 discusses shuttles, such as those that operate between Williamstown and Newport, or Alamein and Camberwell. I couldn't understand this paragraph. The first part requires both timetabled and actual co-ordination. However to my mind this is contradicted by the second part which does not even require the shuttle to be delayed.

Information

Timetables used to be hosted on both the Connex and Metlink websites, with different formats in use. Metro now links to its timetables on the Metlink site. However as real time information is only provided on the Metro site, Metlink cannot yet be regarded as a single source for service information (although it can be for timetables).

Page 83 of the agreement deals with this. While the operator can provide real-time information direct to passengers, it must also provide it to Metlink, apparently with the intention that Metlink will also carry live information.

A very unusual service improvement

Page 84 contains an obscure service improvement that as far as I know has gone unpublicised. On Good Friday and Christmas Day trains have always run a Sunday timetable, with a Saturday schedule applying on other public holidays. Since Sunday train services were upgraded about 10 years ago, their main difference compared to Saturday schedules was that first services were 2-3 hours later.

7.21a of the agreement says that Christmas Day and Good Friday services must run to the master timetable for Sunday except that services must be provided as per the weekday timetable until the Sunday timetable kicks in. If this is correct, we have the anomaly of early morning services as frequently as 10-20 minutes, then every 30-40 minutes around 8am and then back to 20 minutes after about 11am. Similar changes also apply if Australia Day and ANZAC Day fall on a Sunday, though at least in the latter case there may well be higher patronage, depending on the timing for early services.

Extra money will need to be found for drivers to run frequent trains in the early hours of Good Friday and Christmas Day that few passengers will use. I am not convinced that this necessarily represents the wisest use of resources given that other service improvements (eg daytime frequencies extended to 8-9pm, consistent Sunday evening train frequencies and/or earlier trains on Sunday mornings) would all deliver better patronage gains.

Passengers and staffing

Passengers get their own section (p85). This relates to the publication of a Customer Service Charter in specified languages and formats, a compensation code, refund policy, complaints process, DDA compliance, an ill passenger protocol and lost property.

Crowd Management is a major new area. The Franchisee must have a Crowd Management Plan and employ more platform assistants at inner-city stations. Also new are surveys and quarterly monitoring of customer satisfaction (note that quarterly is consistent with Track Record reports). Big drops must be explained.

Increased staffing has been promised. These include 22 staffed stations (these will be host). The Franchise agreement also specifies that there will be a minimum of 350 Authorised Officers (page 95).

Fares and ticketing

Fares are set by the Department (and approved by the State Government). Contrary to what some claim in the letters pages the operator does not set fares. Hence the fares and ticketing section of the contract is brief and requires working within the fares structure, current and new ticketing systems and an obligation to counter fare evasion.

Relationships

Section 11 deals with interoperator relationships. It is hard going. But there are some items of interest, such as safety, branding obligations, track access for heritage rail groups, operator accreditation and more. 12 to 14 are financial and administrative aspects.

Electricity procurement is the topic of Section 15. This came up in the Parliamentary Inquiry into train services. An important issue is security of supply, especially on hot days when loads are high.

Rulling stock and availability

This post is more than long enough and few will have read this far. But the contract gets no less important. Part III deals with rolling stock. Very topical since last summer's disruptions were exacerbated by inadequate air conditioning on Comeng trains. 'Faulty trains' are at least a partially preventable cause of service cancellations. Topics covered in this portion include repair, renewal and peak availability. Peak availability requires improved performance over time - 92% at contract commencement and 94% in 24 months (page 174). Low availability constitutes a 'call-in' event. The current Master Timetable requires 145 trains, with possible variations when new timetables are introduced.

Non-performance

What happens if the operator doesn't perform? Read Part IV for this. The first level is a 'call-in', ie a 'please explain' for which a remedial plan may be required. Next is a 'franchisee breach'. For this a 'cure plan' must be presented and the Director may impose a penalty. Finally there is termination. The department may use 'step in' powers for terminations or severe breaches. These appear to be 'reserve powers', only to be used sparingly and in exceptional circumstances.

Annexures including loading and frequency standards

The second part of the franchise document contains the annexures. These contain the more detailed standards, formulas and methods. Still it's worth a look for the passenger weightings (can compare relative patronage of lines) and frequency standards (termed 'maximum delay minutes' - Schedule 7). These are low 'minimum standards' that in some cases are both non-clockface (eg 25 or 40 minutes) and represent less service than currently runs.

Against this should be compared Victorian Transport Plan and other statements about moving to a 'metro-style service'. If the agreement fully reflected this it could have defined a core network across which a high minimum service frequency (say every 10 minutes) would apply after a program of upgraded services over several years. If we take the authorities at their word, we can only assume that any plans for service improvement will be contained in other (more easily revised?) documents and the low minimum standards have been inserted in the franchise agreement to give the franchisee and the Department significant 'wriggle room'.

Conclusion

Overall these contracts are a difficult but rewarding read that will inform the reader of the broader operating context for Melbourne's trains. Highly recommended.

Out with the old, in with the new

Rail staff worked around the clock as Melbourne rebranded its rail system from Connex to Metro. Trains got programmed with the new announcements on Saturday night. Sunday night and early Monday morning saw old logos covered, new posters posted and even an information centre reclad. Metro managers enthusiastically rode their first train (the 4:17am from Frankston) studying passenger boardings along the way.

The previous operator, Connex, exited with little fanfare; few partied like it was 1999. That is except for staff and enthusiasts who held internal functions or rode final trains to mark the operator's ten years in Melbourne.

Below are some photos from yesterday and today.

YESTERDAY

11:17pm: The last Connex service from Frankston at Chelsea

TODAY

5:30am: Remodelled Flinders St Station information centre

5:35am: Metro posters

6:30am: Connex banner has just been lowered, Metro banner raised

6:35am: half Connex, half Metro

7:00am: Remodelled Flinders St Station information centre - almost ready for business

7:30am: Metro both sides

BACKGROUND READING

Train Franchising Contracts

Customer service counters at city stations

In two months or less Victoria will have an (almost) statewide ticketing system based on durable Myki smartcards and short-term cardboard tickets. Ticket machines will dispense tickets for both metropolitan and country trips and staff will be able to sell tickets to any destination. Smartcard users on non-reserved services will not need to visit a booking office at all.

This stands to change the way customer service is delivered, especially at the larger stations with multiple ticket offices. We may end up with fewer locations that do more as the distinction between V/Line and metropolitan blurs.

For posterity, I though it would be worthwhile to document counter service at the CBD's second and third busiest stations immediately before Myki commences. Approximate usage is given, but this is a rough guide only and some (like luggage for long distance services) may be very 'peaky'.

Melbourne Central

A CBD station served by suburban trains that operate via the City Loop (ie most of them). A significant mid-city hub underneath a shopping centre.

Main entrance to platforms (well-used)

Here you see a full-service metropolitan train counter and a limited-service counter for V/Line (ie country services). The latter's opening hours are limited (closing during the pm peak) and not all payment methods are accepted.

Access from Swanston Street and the City Loop's midday reversal both work against the V/Line booth at this location. For most of its opening hours there are no direct trains to Southern Cross and passengers must join their train at North Melbourne. This makes either Flinders Street or Southern Cross more suitable locations than Melbourne Central for starting a V/Line journey.

Southern Cross

The city's newest station building served by nearly all of Victoria's suburban, country and interstate trains. Located next to the growing Docklands precinct and sees heavy use during sporting events.

Collins Street end

Metropolitan Tickets (well-used)

Regional Tickets (currently busy with long queues at popular times)

Information (well-used)

Myki (currently quiet but likely to become much busier)

Bourke Street end

Metropolitan Tickets (well-used)

Regional Tickets (quieter and well worth the walk from Collins St)

Luggage (generally quiet)

I will not speculate on what will happen when Myki is introduced and more of the routine purchases are done by machine or automatically. At a large multi-level site like Southern Cross there is a trade-off between the number of service locations, efficiency (expressed in customer waiting time and staffing) and fast, convenient access to a service desk.

A smaller number of service locations may increase average walking times but reduce waiting times and their variability. For instance two differently located booths might each have a window open but one might be quiet and the other busy. In contrast one booth with two windows open is more efficient as it reduces variability in waiting times. Walking time may be longer but the waiting time saved may exceed that during busy periods. Rostering is also easier for a single location and more staff can be more readily be put on (in busy times three people may be justified). However care nees to be taken that the number of windows open is as near as possible to staff present to speed service.

Station Park & Rides - is there a higher and better use?

A term popular in property valuation and development circles is 'highest and best' use. In commercial real estate the value of land depends on the use to which it can be put. If it has high rental, development or subdivision potential it is worth more than land that does not possess these attributes.

Failure to develop land for its 'highest and best use' represents an 'opportunity cost' for the owner. The owner may still profit from its existing use, but the return will be lower. But if the return the owner is getting is at a lower risk, or if it is taken in a non-financial form such as a better standard of living derived from living on a large block, then they may be quite content not to develop further.

But where publicly owned land is used for marginal, low-return uses, it is only prudent that one asks if it has a higher and better use. In this case the utility may be measured in financial terms, social terms or a mixture.

Parking space at stations is a case in point. Its provision may attract passengers who find driving to the station preferable to walking, cycling or taking a bus. The land may be useful to keep in reserve for future infrastructure, such as extra tracks, stabling, passing loops or bus interchanges.

On the other hand, because parking is uncharged, it returns no direct income to the railways and so may incur opportunity costs such as foregone rental income (if the land was developed), lower bus patronage or reduced walkability.

To try to quantify opportunity costs, one needs to assess both capital and income gains possible from a 'higher and better use' for park and ride land. This needs to be compared to the maintenance costs of park and ride, and if a park and ride is being built or expanded, capital costs as well.

These factors vary by area; a park and ride in a high-land value inner or bayside suburb imposes a much higher opportunity costs than using a scrap of otherwise unusable land near an outer or ex-urban station. It's also worth mentioning that even with different types of parking there are differences; substituting high-turnover short-term shopper parking for low-turnover long-term commuter parking benefits local retailers so probably represents a higher and better use, at least for the local area.

While coarse, the following back of the envelope calculations may assist in estimating opportunity costs.

The first thing is to look at the cost of park & ride. The Victorian Transport Plan has a $60 million program. 1700 new spots are mentioned, but these are only part of the program, so to claim $35 000 per spot sounds excessive. However a figure less than half that is mentioned here. The cost in Perth appears to be a bit over $10 000 per bay. Passengers contribute up to a maximum of around $2000 in fares annually, which buys unlimited travel in Zones 1 and 2.

The other input is the land itself. Wikipedia reckons you should allow 30 square metres per average parking spot, including circulation areas and landscaping. In other words, 100 parking spots equates to about 3000 square metres, or 0.3 hectare.

How much is the land worth? This varies greatly depending on the locality, use and zoning. But going on residential values, $400-500k will buy a house on a 600 square metre block in a median suburb. If we take the land component as being $300k per block, then that's a value of $500 per square metre. Land near a station may be regarded as undesirable due to noise and traffic despite its convenience. So it could be worth less - maybe $300 - 400 per square metre. That is unless its development potential makes it more rather than less attractive. Anyway, let's say the 0.3 ha is worth $1 million, which is very conservative.

How does this relate to the 100 parkers and riders? They're getting exclusive use of a million dollar asset for 10 hours per day. Based on a land value of $10k per spot and an imputed commercial rental return of 10% pa, they are getting a 'free lunch'. 10% of $10k is $1000 per year, or over 50% of their fare (which ought to be going onto running the service). And this does not include the capital costs required to build the car park.

Having done the costs, let's get to the opportunities. What can you do with 0.3 hectare, or 3/4 acre in the old money? It's good for five houses on standard 600m2 blocks, fifteen townhouses or villas each with generous courtyards. Stack said units to make a 3-storey block and we're up to 40+ flats.

Assuming $400k per house, $300k per unit, or $250k per flat, that's a developed site value of $2 million with houses, $4.5 million with units or $10 million with flats.

With a 5% rental yield on the above prices, annual rental revenue would be about $100k for the houses, $225k for the units or $500k for the flats. While we have over 200 suburban stations, if just 20 could be developed, the potential rental income would be in the low millions, or the financial equivalent of hundreds if not thousands more commuters buying Zone 1+2 full fare yearly tickets.

Good design could incorporate improved amenity, for instance passive surveillance of the station precinct. Less NIMBY-minded councils may even provide a waiver on car space requirements in return for a portion of the development being for social housing or (say) a womens refuge.

While there would be a loss of parking spots, this would have to be balanced against the increased population with the station on their doorstep who'd likely on average use the train more, and not just for work trips and the gains possible with improved feeder buses and bicycle facilities.

All things considered, it appears that park and ride may represent close to the 'lowest and worst' land use at many station locations and incur opportunity costs that are not always recognised.

Walking a fine line: A look at Victoria Walks

You may have noticed a new link added to the sidebar - Victoria Walks.

While I've previously posted on pedestrian issues, the emphasis has been on walking to access public transport and transfer between services.

However walking also needs to be regarded as a transport mode in its own right, and not just as a means of recreation or physical exercise. Walking even beats public transport for some trips. The distance where walking is faster ranges from about 1 to 5 kilometres, with higher figures in pedestrian-hostile locations, or where where transit has limited frequency, connectivity, directness and coverage.

How significant is walking as transport? The census question about transport asks about the journey to work. This is the very journey that people are least likely to walk and walking's modal share is low. Counting all trips would probably give a higher share for walking but it is still often dismissed as a 'minor access mode'.

What are the main threats to walking's attractiveness as transport? Key is bad urban and traffic system design, with examples being missing footpaths, absence of crossing facilities, buildings that don't address the street or have easy footpath access, long traffic light cycles or excessive use of roundabouts, blank walls facing footpaths and poor passive surveillance. The design of our suburbs, covering matters such as a permeable street grid, location of transit stops, and co-siting of activity centres around transport nodes are also important. The costs of designing new suburbs along these lines is negligible, and even retrofitting existing suburbs need not be expensive given the benefits. There are also social attitudes, for instance a perception of being unsafe when walking. Just as with public transport safety more people walking tends to create a virtuous spiral of 'safety in numbers'.

What is walking's political representation like? Drivers have the RACV. Cyclists have Bicycle Victoria. Public transport passengers have the PTUA. Even though there are more pedestrians than either drivers and public transport passengers, Victorian pedestrians have no organised lobby to advance their interests (whereas NSW has the Pedestrian Council).

As walking costs the user nothing, there is almost no 'walking industry' or 'vested interests'. For example, it requires no ailing car industry for governments to protect with tariffs, subsidies or loan guarantees. It involves no new trains, trams or buses. Plus there are no multimillion dollar franchises, operator contracts or powerful unions at stake. The upgrade of suburban streets to become walkable grids would generate jobs for road construction companies, but these firms could just as easily be building new roads, so these companies don't have a particular vested interest in pedestrian improvement projects either.

Does the lack of political representation for a particular transport mode automatically mean that nothing in that field gets done? Not necessarily. Though Perth's 'Friends of the Railways' were successful in getting the Fremantle line restored, and this fostered the biggest suburban rail revival of any Australian capital, it appears to have been academics and sympathetic governments who maintained the momemtum to complete a series of major projects including electrification, Joondalup, Thornlie and Mandurah. WA appears not to have a passenger lobby group as prominent as the PTUA in Melbourne (and those that are there appear to have been offshoots from a reasonaly strong environment movement, eg STCWA) who would have been expected to advocate such extensions.

The situation as regards walking in Melbourne is a little different. As mentioned above there is no prominent pedestrian lobby. University transport academics occupy high profiles in public debate but public transport and urban planning tend to be their favourite topics. Other matters such as walking and freight transport appears to be less advocated, or at least are less reported in the papers.

Is suburban walkability a significant part of state transport plans and budgets? When considering this allowance needs to be given for the involvement of both local and state governments. The various state transport plans have typically involved road and public transport infrastructure projects, with a swing towards the latter in the Victorian Transport Plan. Pedestrian access was not a major part of this plan, or of the debate that preceded it (about the Eddington report, tunnels and surging rail patronage). While there exists a Local Area Access Program that supports pedestrian access projects, its budget appears to reflect the extent to which walking is regarded as a serious transport mode.

The lack of a lobby and academics to lead debate, the relative absence of media on pedestrian access topics (outside the occasional article in the local paper) and the absence of a significant program to make existing suburbs walkable all indicate unmet needs. These only intensify when the social and fitness benefits of walking are added.

Stepping into this gap is the Victoria Walks website. This turns out to be a registered charity sponsored by VicHealth. VicHealth is a health promotion foundation established by parliament as part of the Tobacco Control Act (1987). Although funded by cigarette taxes, its health promotion goes well beyond the Quit Campaign to includes areas such as physical activity, which is where Walking School Buses and Victoria Walks come in.

To reflect its sponsor's aims, the motivation behind Victoria Walks appears to be the health benefits of walking. This is much like how cycling and cycle tracks is seen as a recreation as much as a transport mode. And some might see buses in some areas mainly as social welfare, since their ridership is predominantly 'captive passengers'. Which leaves cars, trucks and trains as the 'serious' transport modes deserving of 'real dollars' through various transport plans and administered by a dedicated department.

What is the content of Victoria Walks? There is one thing it isn't; it's not a simple exhortation for everyone to walk at least 30 minutes a day.

Instead it emphasises a 'bigger picture' or 'community engagement' model. If psychology can be said to emphasise the individual's mind and sociology society's values, Victoria Walks is clearly favours the social, the community and the 'active' (politically as much as physically).

Hence site readers are encouraged to do 'walking audits' of their neighbourhood and form 'walking action groups' to 'engage government'. There are many case studies from parts of Melbourne and around the world to open minds as to what can be done. And the achievements of Walking Action Groups, such as questions in parliament and replies from councils, are highlighted for further encouragement.

Although its excellent website contains much useful background information, Victoria Walks is not a lobby group in itself. After all its funding source effectively makes it an arm of government, and one area trying to lobby another part would look odd. Nevertheless it does engage in what I would term 'advocacy support'. They won't directly lobby or give specific advice but the website acts as an enabler, encourager and mouthpiece for others to do so.

Victoria Walks is an example of initiative on an aspect of transport coming from outside the department ostensibly responsible for it. The progress of it, and particularly any activity it spawns, will be well worth watching.